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The New Peonage 
Tamar R. Birckhead∗ 
Abstract 
Although the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
formally abolished slavery and involuntary servitude in 1865, the 
text created an exception for the punishment of crimes “whereof the 
party shall have been duly convicted.” Two years later, Congress 
passed The Anti-Peonage Act in an attempt to prohibit the practice 
of coerced labor for debt. Yet, in the wake of the Civil War, 
Southern states innovated ways to impose peonage but avoid 
violations of the law, including criminal surety statutes that 
allowed employers to pay the court fines for indigent 
misdemeanants charged with minor offenses in exchange for a 
commitment to work. Surplus from these payments padded public 
coffers (as well as the pockets of court officials), and when workers’ 
debt records were subsequently “lost” or there was an allegation of 
breach, surety contracts were extended, and workers became 
further indebted to local planters and merchants. Several decades 
later in Bailey v. Alabama (1911) and United States v. Reynolds 
(1914), the Supreme Court invalidated laws criminalizing simple 
contractual breaches, which Southern states had used to skirt the 
general provisions of the Anti-Peonage Act. Yet, these decisions 
ultimately had little impact on the “ever-turning wheel of 
servitude,” and the practice persisted under alternative forms 
until after World War II. 
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This Article examines the phenomenon of what the Author 
calls “the new peonage.” It posits that the reconfiguration of the 
South’s judicial system after the Civil War, which entrapped 
blacks in a perpetual cycle of coerced labor, has direct parallels to 
the two-tiered system of justice that exists in our juvenile and 
criminal courtrooms of today. Across the United States, even 
seemingly minor criminal charges trigger an array of fees, court 
costs, and assessments that can create insurmountable debt 
burdens for already struggling families. Likewise, parents who 
fall behind on their child support payments face the risk of 
incarceration, and upon release from jail, they must pay off the 
arrears that accrued, which hinders the process of reentry. 
Compounding such scenarios, criminal justice debt can lead to 
driver’s license suspension, bank account or wage garnishment, 
extended supervision until debts are paid, additional court 
appearances or warrants related to debt collection and 
nonpayment, and extra fines and interest for late payment. When 
low-income parents face such collateral consequences, the very act 
of meeting the most basic physical and emotional needs of their 
children becomes a formidable challenge, the failure of which can 
trigger the intervention of Child Protective Services, potential 
neglect allegations, and further court hearings and fees. For youth 
in the juvenile court system, mandatory fees impose a burden that 
increases the risk of recidivism. In short, for families caught 
within the state’s debt-enforcement regime, the threat of 
punishment is an ever-present specter, and incarceration always 
looms. Ironically, rather than having court fees serve as a 
straightforward revenue source for the state, this hidden 
regressive tax requires an extensive infrastructure to turn court 
and correctional officials into collection agents, burdening the 
system and interfering with the proper administration of justice. 
Moreover, states frequently divert court fees and assessments to 
projects that have little connection to the judicial system. 
This Article is the first to analyze the ways in which the 
contemporary justice tax has the same societal impact as post-Civil 
War peonage: Both function to maintain an economic caste system. 
The Article opens with two case profiles to illustrate the legal 
analysis in narrative form, followed by several others presented 
throughout the piece. The Article then chronicles the legal history 
of peonage from the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment 
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through the early twentieth century. It establishes the parallels to 
the present-day criminal justice system, in which courts 
incarcerate or re-incarcerate those who cannot pay. It argues that 
Supreme Court decisions intended to end the use of debtors’ 
prisons ultimately had limited impact. The Article concludes with 
proposals for legislative and public policy reform of the new 
peonage, including data collection and impact analysis of fines, 
restitution, and user fees; ending incarceration and extended 
supervision for non-willful failure to pay; and establishing the 
right to counsel in nonpayment hearings. 
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I. Introduction 
“[He] is thus kept chained to an ever-turning wheel of 
servitude. . . .” 
United States v. Reynolds1 
 
In the 1860s, an African-American man whom I will call 
Marcus2 was born into slavery on a plantation in Elberton, 
Georgia.3 Shortly after the end of the Civil War, Marcus was 
emancipated, and at age ten, he was hired to work picking cotton 
for the owner of the plantation, known as the Captain.4 Although 
Marcus had no formal education and rarely left the plantation, 
the conditions under which he lived during his youth were 
tolerable.5 When he turned twenty-one, Marcus agreed to enter 
into a one-year labor contract with the Captain, earning $3.50 
each week and living in a one-room log cabin.6 He married one of 
the Captain’s house-servants, Mandy, and they lived in a two-room 
shanty.7 
After several years, during which Marcus renewed his 
contract annually, the Captain died, and his son—called the 
Senator after entering elected office in Atlanta—took over the 
plantation.8 At the Senator’s suggestion, Marcus signed a 
                                                                                                     
 1.  235 U.S. 133, 147–48 (1914). 
 2. As the source for this case study is an anonymous, autobiographical 
essay appearing in a magazine published in New York in 1904, a name for the 
individual has been given for narrative clarity.  
 3. See The New Slavery in the South—An Autobiography, INDEPENDENT, 
Feb. 25, 1904, at 409, (presenting the autobiographical story of an anonymous 
African American in the Southern United States during the period following the 
Civil War), available at http://docsouth.unc.edu/fpn/negpeon/negpeon.html.  
 4. See id. (explaining that Marcus’ uncle hired him out to the Captain and 
he worked picking cotton). 
 5. See id. (noting that he had clothes, a place to sleep, ten to fifteen cents 
per week for “spending change,” and that he and everybody who worked there 
“was happy”). 
 6. See id. at 410 (“When I reached twenty-one the Captain told me I was a 
free man, but he urged me to stay with him. He said he would treat me right, 
and pay me as much as anybody else would. . . . And I stayed.”). 
 7. See id. (describing how Mandy also worked for the Captain, and after 
Marcus and Mandy married he felt like “the biggest man in Georgia”). 
 8. See id. (noting that the Captain died five years after Marcus had 
started annually renewing his contract, resulting in the Senator taking over the 
property). 
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ten-year contract, and not long after, the state began leasing out 
convicted men to work on the plantation.9 The Senator paid the 
state $200 annually for each man’s labor, housed them in 
stockades, and kept them in shackles as they worked under the 
supervision of armed guards provided by the state.10 Although 
Marcus and the other free laborers were frightened by these 
developments, they understood that they had no choice but to 
fulfill their ten-year contracts.11 After Marcus’s contract expired, 
however,the Senator told him that he had incurred $165 worth of 
debt at the plantation commissary, where free laborers were 
compelled to buy all their necessities, including food and 
clothing.12 Marcus then learned that his contract required that 
his debt—and that of the other free laborers—had to be paid off 
by hard labor; he was placed in the stockade with the leased 
prisoners and forced to work from sunrise to sunset with little 
food or rest, under the constant threat of physical punishment.13 
Meanwhile, Mandy became a slave “mistress”14 for one of the 
                                                                                                     
 9. See id. (explaining how shortly after Marcus signed a ten-year contract, 
the Senator built a shanty, which “looked for all the world like stalls for horses” 
and then brought in “prisoners who had been leased by the Senator from the 
State of Georgia”).  
 10. See id. (“[The prisoners] were quartered in the long, low shanty, 
afterward called the stockade . . . .leased by the Senator . . . at about $200 each 
year, the State agreeing to pay for guards and physicians, for necessary 
inspection . . . and all other incidental camp expenses.”).  
 11. See id. at 410–11 (describing how the laborers met with the intention of 
quitting, but learned that if they did not fulfill their contracts they would face 
consequences such as being locked in the stockades, “run down by bloodhounds,” 
or “beat[en] brutally”). 
 12. See id. at 411 (“[The Senator] had established a large store, which was 
called the commissary. All of us free laborers were compelled to buy our 
supplies . . . from that store.”).  
 13. See id. at 411–12 (“Really, we had made ourselves lifetime slaves, or 
peons, as the law called us. But, call it slavery, peonage, or what not, the truth 
is we lived in a hell on earth what time we spent in the Senator’s peon camp.”). 
 14. Using the term “mistress” in this context can be misleading, as Mandy 
was likely coerced into the role under threat of violence; it is, however, the term 
used by the author of the essay, id. at 412, so it is presented as a direct quote 
here. See also Margaret Sullivan, Times Regrets ‘Slave Mistress’ in Julian 
Bond’s Obituary, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://public 
editor.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/20/times-regrets-slave-mistress-in-julian-
bonds-obituary/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (“Retiring this phrase [‘slave 
mistress’] and expressing regret about using it has nothing to do with political 
correctness. It’s about recognizing the history of slavery in America, at a time 
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white male supervisors at the camp, and Marcus’s nine-year-old 
son was given away to a black family across the river in South 
Carolina.15 After three years, the white man who was now living 
with Mandy told Marcus that he was being released; he drove 
Marcus into South Carolina and told him to “git,” leaving him 
penniless, with a pair of overalls as his only possession.16 
Eventually Marcus made his way to Birmingham, Alabama, 
where he worked in coal mines and smelted iron.17  
By 1904, when Marcus published his autobiography in a New 
York magazine, the Captain’s convict or “peon” camp was one of 
six or seven that leased prisoners from the state.18 Throughout 
Georgia, blacks as well as whites were held in similar conditions 
to pay off debts they had allegedly incurred: 
[T]here are hundreds and hundreds of farms all over the State 
where negroes, and in some cases poor white folks, are held in 
bondage on the ground that they are working out debts, or 
where the contracts which they have made hold them in a kind 
of perpetual bondage, because under those contracts, they may 
not quit one employer and hire out to another, except by and 
with the knowledge and consent of the former employer. One 
of the usual ways to secure laborers for a large peonage camp 
is for the proprietor to send out an agent to the little courts in 
the towns and villages, and where a man charged with some 
petty offense has no friends or money the agent will urge him 
to plead guilty, with the understanding that the agent will pay 
his fine, and in that way save him from the disgrace of being 
sent to jail or the chain-gang! For this high favor, the man 
must sign beforehand a paper signifying his willingness to go 
to the farm and work out the amount of the fine imposed. 
When he reaches the farm, he has to be fed and clothed, to be 
sure, and these things are charged up to his account. By the 
                                                                                                     
when race is at the forefront of the nation’s consciousness. Language matters.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 15. See The New Slavery in the South—An Autobiography, supra note 3, at 
412 (“[M]y wife was still kept for a while in the ‘Big House,’ but my little boy, 
who was only nine years old, was given away to a negro family across the river 
in South Carolina, and I never saw or heard of him after that.”). 
 16. Id. at 414. 
 17. See id. (describing how Marcus “begged [his] way to Columbia” and was 
hired to work in a coal mine in Birmingham, Alabama and “reckon[s] [he’ll] die 
either in a coal mine or an iron furnace” but stated that “[e]ither is better than a 
Georgia peon camp”).  
 18. Id. at 413. 
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time he has worked out his first debt, another is hanging over 
his head, and so on and so on, by a sort of endless chain for an 
indefinite period, as in every case the indebtedness is 
arbitrarily arranged by the employer. In many cases it is very 
evident that the court officials are in collusion with the 
proprietors or agents, and that they divide the “graft” among 
themselves.19 
More than a century later on the opposite coast in 
Washington State, David Ramirez struggled to cope with the 
fallout from criminal-justice debt that he had incurred a decade 
earlier.20 In 2003, David pled guilty to a single count of 
residential burglary after entering the home of his ex-wife 
without her permission.21 The court ordered him to pay $2,144 in 
restitution and over $1,147 in penalties and costs.22 At the time 
he was earning only $10 per hour, and was also required to pay 
$500 a month in child support.23 A couple of years later, because 
of medical problems and a lax economy, David lost his job and 
was receiving public assistance when he missed a court-ordered 
payment, and a warrant was issued for his arrest.24 To have the 
warrant lifted, David had to pay the full amount owed plus an 
additional $100 “warrant fee” for a total of $800.25 Unable to 
afford counsel, David lived in fear of arrest for a year until a 
lawyer from his church helped him negotiate a lower payment; 
after borrowing money, he was finally able to have the warrant 
lifted.26  
Since then, David has resumed a reasonable payment plan 
and has not missed a payment, but it has not been easy.27 He 
                                                                                                     
 19. Id. 
 20. See ACLU OF WASH. & COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVS., MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ 
PRISONS: THE WAYS COURT-IMPOSED DEBTS PUNISH PEOPLE FOR BEING POOR 13–
14 (2014) (describing the repercussions from criminal-justice debt incurred as a 
result of a felony after more than a decade). 
 21. Id. at 13. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. 
 24. See id. (describing how a warrant was issued for David’s arrest in 2008 
after he missed a payment due to being unemployed and on public assistance).  
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. (“[David] basically lived in fear of arrest for a year until a 
lawyer in [his] church agreed to help [him] negotiate a lower payment to quash 
the warrant.”). 
 27. See id. (explaining that David pays $30 per month toward his 
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supports his four children, and the family relies on $400 a month 
in public assistance and food stamps.28 David often must choose 
between paying his fines and meeting his family’s needs, such as 
paying the utility bills or buying winter coats for his children.29 
His current debt balance of $1,839 is composed solely of interest, 
which continues to accrue and will take him another five years to 
pay off.30 He described his situation in stark terms:  
The message the courts have sent to me over and over again is 
that if I don’t pay in full every month, I’ll go to jail and I’ll lose 
everything. I’ve had judges tell me that they don’t care what 
my other obligations are [because] LFOs [legal financial 
obligations] come first: first before food and shelter. It doesn’t 
matter what the family suffers, so long as the court gets 
paid.31 
Across the United States, even minor criminal charges, such 
as loitering, littering, and unpaid traffic tickets, trigger an array 
of fees, court costs, and assessments in both juvenile and criminal 
courts.32 These fees can create insurmountable debt burdens for 
already struggling families.33 One might think that the Supreme 
Court had effectively created a barrier against such charges in a 
series of cases beginning in 1970, when the Court concluded that 
extending a prison term for an inability to pay criminal-justice 
debt violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause in Williams v. Illinois.34 In 1971, the Court found it 
                                                                                                     
criminal-justice debt, but because he is unemployed and has four children even 
the $30 per month can be difficult). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. at 14 (“Sometimes, [David] ha[s] to choose between paying the 
electricity bill and paying [legal financial obligations], or between buying [his] 
kid a winter coat and paying [legal financial obligations].” 
 30. Id. (“[David] ha[s] a balance of $1,838.74, and that’s exactly what [he] 
owe[s] in interest.”  
 31. Id. 
 32. See MITALI NAGRECHA ET AL., WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS, FINING THE FAMILY 
4 (2013) (“This debt may range from money owed to a public defender 
(oxymoronic as this may seem) to fines, surcharges, and fees assessed at the 
time of sentencing and post-sentencing, such as victim restitution, court costs, 
and parole fees.”). 
 33. See id. (“These fees and fines add up to a significant financial burden 
for mostly low-income defendants and are administered without much regard 
for an individual’s ability to pay.”). 
 34. See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1970) (finding 
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unconstitutional to impose a fine as a sentence and automatically 
convert it into a jail term when the defendant cannot afford to 
pay the fine in Tate v. Short.35 Then in 1983, the Court barred the 
revocation of probation for failure to pay a fine without first 
inquiring into a person’s ability to pay in Bearden v. Georgia.36 
Yet, jurisdictions continue to ignore or “skirt the edges” of these 
requirements and consider almost every failure to pay willful.37 
Some courts even impose a “fines or time” alternative sentence 
that forces defendants to “choose” between jail and immediate 
payment in full.38  
For low-income families, criminal-justice debt can lead to 
driver’s license suspension, bank account or wage garnishment, 
extended supervision until debts are paid, additional court 
appearances or warrants related to debt collection and 
nonpayment, and extra fines and interest for late payment.39 
                                                                                                     
“impermissible discrimination” where imprisonment exceeds the statutory limit 
and results due to “involuntary nonpayment of a fine”); see also infra Part III.A 
(discussing the facts and holding of Williams v. Illinois as part of an 
examination of criminal-justice debt and constitutional constraints the Supreme 
Court has found). 
 35. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) (finding it unconstitutional 
to “impos[e] a fine as a sentence and then automatically [convert] it into a jail 
term because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in 
full”). 
 36. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983) (“We hold, therefore, 
that in revocation proceedings for failure to pay a fine or restitution, a 
sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay.’’); see also 
infra Part III.A (discussing the facts and holding of Bearden v. Georgia as part 
of an examination of criminal-justice debt case law and related constitutional 
restraints). 
 37. See ALICIA BANNON ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO 
REENTRY 20 (2010) (examining how interviews with defendants and court 
personnel showed that many jurisdictions imprison defendants for unpaid debts 
without inquiring into ability to pay, or wait until after arrest or jail to put forth 
an inquiry). 
 38. See, e.g., ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ 
PRISONS 23–24 (2010) (discussing a municipal court in New Orleans where 
judges regularly offer defendants one of two choices: either pay a fine or face 
time in jail). 
 39. See, e.g., NAGRECHA ET AL., supra note 32, at 28–29 (“The frustration of 
debt obligations is not simply aimed . . . at the [child support] arrears that 
accumulate in prison that no amount of prison wages at existing levels can 
reduce; it is also about the continued financial obligations that individuals face 
once released.”); see also infra Part III.C (examining how parents with criminal 
justice debt face unique hardships, from difficulties renting to an increased 
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When parents face such collateral consequences, the very act of 
meeting the most basic physical and emotional needs of one’s 
children can become a formidable challenge.40 Failure to meet 
those needs can trigger the intervention of Child Protective 
Services, potential neglect allegations, and further court hearings 
and fees.41 For non-custodial parents, failure to pay child support 
can lead to time in jail, and the debt often continues to accrue 
during the period of incarceration, making it nearly impossible 
for the parent to become current.42 
For youth in the juvenile court system, mandatory attorney 
fees, detention fees, restitution fines, and supervision fees impose 
burdens that increase the risk of recidivism.43 When these 
circumstances are exacerbated by aggravating factors such as 
developmental delays, substance abuse, or mental illness, 
                                                                                                     
likelihood of problems for their children).  
 40. See infra Part III.C (examining how parents with criminal-justice debt 
face unique hardships, including difficulties renting and affording clothing for 
their children). 
 41. See, e.g., Candra Bullock, Comment, Low-Income Parents Victimized by 
Child Protective Services, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 1023, 1043–44 
(2003) (discussing a case where child services removed two children from their 
father’s care when he could not afford to pay the electric bill, and the 
subsequent Illinois court case finding that neglect due to impoverishment 
should not so easily lead to a loss of parental rights); James Herbie DiFonzo, 
Parental Responsibility for Juvenile Crime, 80 OR. L. REV. 1, 92–96 (2001) 
(explaining that findings of parental neglect or abuse as well as failing to 
comply with court orders can lead to the removal of the child from the parent’s 
custody). 
 42. See NAGRECHA ET AL., supra note 32, at 4 (“We include child support 
debt as part of criminal-justice debt because it often accrues while individuals 
are incarcerated and unable to pay.”). 
 43. See Stacy Hoskins Haynes et al., Juvenile Economic Sanctions: An 
Analysis of their Imposition, Payment, and Effect on Recidivism, 13 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 31, 37–38 (2014) (describing studies showing that 
burdens imposed by economic sanctions “might interfere with a juvenile’s ability 
to reenter society successfully after a conviction, thereby increasing the risk of 
recidivism”); R. Barry Ruback, The Benefits and Costs of Economic Sanctions: 
Considering the Victim, the Offender, and Society, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1796, 
1811–12 (2015) (explaining that failure to make payments of court fees, fines, or 
restitution can lead to probation or incarceration and that the imposition of 
economic sanctions can make it difficult for offenders, including juveniles, to 
avoid recidivism); see also infra Part III.B (finding that because juveniles often 
do not have the means to pay fines and their parents lack the resources to assist 
them (and can face garnishment of wages for their children’s fees), it can be 
difficult if not impossible for juveniles to avoid recidivism). 
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families without extensive support networks have little chance of 
succeeding.44 In short, for children and their parents who are 
caught within the State’s debt-enforcement regime, the threat of 
punishment is an ever-present specter, and incarceration always 
looms.45 
One of the inherent ironies of criminal-justice debt is that 
rather than serving as a straightforward revenue source for the 
state, juvenile and criminal justice system fees require an 
extensive infrastructure to turn court and correctional officials 
into collection agents.46 This hidden regressive tax, therefore, 
burdens the system and actually interferes with the proper 
administration of justice.47 Moreover, states frequently divert 
court fees and assessments to projects that have little connection 
to the judicial system.48 
Although the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
formally abolished slavery and involuntary servitude in 1865, the 
text created an exception for the punishment for crimes “whereof 
the party shall have been duly convicted.”49 It also explicitly 
provided for enactment of supplemental legislation to enforce the 
                                                                                                     
 44. See NAGRECHA ET AL., supra note 32, at 19–20 (explaining that 
individuals must often heavily rely on family and friends for help making 
payments). 
 45. See infra Part III.B (discussing difficulties imposed on juveniles who 
face legal financial obligations). 
 46. See, e.g., ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 38, at 9 (explaining how 
utilizing court and correctional officers for collections cost money and may be 
“cost-ineffective”); see also infra Part III.D (explaining that the costs of 
employing individuals to collect fines and fees and enforce non-payment often 
results in little to no money flowing into the judiciary). 
 47. See ROOPAL PATEL & MEGHNA PHILIP, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A 
TOOLKIT FOR ACTION 6 (2012) (“Judges are no longer able to act as impartial 
adjudicators if they are forced to act as collection agents. . . . As crime rates 
fluctuate, perverse policy incentives could develop.”).  
 48. See id. (“This undermines the separation of powers by forcing courts to 
act as fundraisers for other programs or agencies created by the legislature or 
executives.”); see also infra Part III.D (examining the widespread practice of 
states putting money obtained through legal financial obligations into general 
coffers rather than funding programs meant to decrease crime and lower 
recidivism). 
 49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; see also Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 
790, 796 (1871) (describing convicts as “for the time being a slave of the State. 
He is civiliter mortus; and his estate, if he has any, is administered like that of a 
dead man”). 
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amendment’s substantive provisions.50 Two years later, Congress 
passed the Anti-Peonage Act51 in an attempt to prohibit the 
practice of coerced labor for debt.52 Yet, in the wake of the Civil 
War, Southern states innovated ways to continue to reap many of 
the economic and labor market benefits of chattel slavery by 
enacting a network of criminal and penal statutes that effectively 
turned over convicted defendants—most of them newly freed 
slaves—to private employers, whether plantation owners or 
industrial corporations, ostensibly to “pay off” their criminal 
debts through enforced labor.53 Among the innovations were 
criminal surety statutes that allowed employers to pay the court 
fines for indigent misdemeanants charged with readily 
manufactured crimes, such as vagrancy, adultery, and use of 
offensive language, in exchange for a commitment to work.54 
Surplus from these payments padded public coffers (as well as 
the pockets of court officials), and when workers’ debt records 
were subsequently “lost” or there was an allegation of breach, 
surety contracts were extended and workers became further 
indebted to local planters and merchants.55  
                                                                                                     
 50. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce 
this article by appropriate legislation.”). 
 51. See 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012) (originally enacted as the Peonage Abolition 
Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 187, § 1, 14 Stat. 546) (providing the civil components of 
the Anti-Peonage Act); 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2012) (originally enacted as Criminal 
Code, § 269) (providing the criminal penalties of the Anti-Peonage Act). 
 52. Peonage is “a status or condition of compulsory service, based upon the 
indebtedness of the peon to the master. The basal fact is indebtedness. . . . Upon 
this is based a condition of compulsory service.” Clyatt v. United States, 197 
U.S. 207, 215 (1905). 
 53. See Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 881, 921 (1998) (exploring “Black Codes” that were passed in 
Southern states that maintained “the substance, if not the form, of black 
bondage”); see also infra Part II.A (discussing “Black Codes” in Southern states 
and failures following the Civil War to dismantle such codes and implement 
laws that allowed for equal treatment of African Americans).  
 54. Klarman, supra note 53, at 922–23, 927; see also United States v. 
Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 146 (1914) (“This labor is performed under the constant 
coercion and threat of another possible arrest and prosecution in case he 
violates the labor contract . . . this form of coercion is as potent as it would have 
been had the law provided for the seizure and compulsory service of the 
convict.”). 
 55. See Slavery by Another Name, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/tpt/slavery-by-
another-name/themes/peonage/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (examining how 
“[t]he paperwork and debt record of individual prisoners was often lost” leading 
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Several decades later, the Supreme Court in Bailey v. 
Alabama56 and United States v. Reynolds57 finally invalidated 
laws criminalizing the simple contractual breaches that Southern 
states had used to skirt the general provisions of the Anti-
Peonage Act.58 Yet, these decisions ultimately had little impact 
on the “ever-turning wheel of servitude,” and the practice 
persisted under alternative forms until after World War II.59  
This Article examines the phenomenon of what I call “the 
new peonage.” The Article is the first to analyze how the 
contemporary “justice tax,” faced by people like David Ramirez 
and thousands like him, ultimately has the same societal impact 
as the post-Civil War practice of peonage:60 both function to 
                                                                                                     
to “inescapable situations” for black men in the South) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 56. 219 U.S. 219 (1911); see also infra Part II.B (laying out the facts and 
analysis in Bailey v. Alabama as part of a discussion on the history of legal 
peonage and the path towards findings of unconstitutionality). 
 57. 235 U.S. 133 (1914); see also infra Part II.B (laying out the facts and 
analysis in United States v. Reynolds as part of a discussion on the history of 
legal peonage and the path towards findings of unconstitutionality). 
 58. Klarman, supra note 53, at 922–23 (explaining that Southern states 
would criminalize contract breaches through alternate tactics such as “false 
pretenses” and “fraudulent intent” laws).  
 59. See id at 926–30 (“[A]fter Reynolds in 1914, the [Supreme] Court 
decided no other peonage cases until World War II, when it finally invalidated 
laws from . . . recalcitrant states [such as Florida and Georgia].”); see also infra 
Part II.C (explaining how, in “the eight Southern States where more than 
seventy-five percent of the black population lived” law enforcement and the 
judiciary were complicit in “effectively nullif[ying] anti-peonage legislation and 
appellate case decisions”). 
 60. Although a LexisNexis search found no legal scholarship closely analyzing 
the parallels between the post-Civil War system of peonage and the consequences of 
contemporary criminal-justice debt, there are a few recently-published law review 
articles that examine the consequences of debt resulting from economic sanctions 
issued by courts and that explore potential legal strategies for reform. See, e.g., 
Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal Defendants Pay for 
Their Court-Appointed Counsel Through Recoupment and Contribution, 42 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 323 (2009) (arguing against court-ordered reimbursement, 
co-pays, and application fees imposed for indigent criminal defense); Ann 
Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization 
of Debt, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 349 (2012) (focusing on bars to voting resulting 
from unpaid criminal debt); Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines 
Clause, 102 CAL. L. REV. 277 (2014) (providing a detailed analysis of colonial and 
early American statutory and court records regarding fines, and arguing that 
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted to 
provide greater individual protections); Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Paying for Your 
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maintain an economic caste system. Utilizing paradigmatic as 
well as narrative modes of expression,61 including case profiles,62 
it posits that the reconfiguration of the South’s judicial system 
after the Civil War, which entrapped African Americans in a 
                                                                                                     
Time: How Charging Inmates Fees Behind Bars May Violate the Excessive Fines 
Clause, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 319 (2014) (arguing that fees charged to inmates 
for room and board, work release, physical examinations, dental visits, 
medication, medical treatment, and other goods and services may violate the 
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and recommending litigation 
strategies for advocates); Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political 
Economy of Application Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 2045 (2006) (exploring the impact of application fees for appointed counsel 
in criminal cases); see also Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual 
Debtor—and a Modest Proposal to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 809, 826–27 (1983) (comparing changes to the bankruptcy code by the 
consumer credit industry as the equivalent of a return to post-Civil War 
peonage practice); Karen Gross, The Debtor as Modern Day Peon: A Problem of 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165 (1990) (assessing 
whether the bankruptcy laws implicate the Thirteenth Amendment through the 
peonage laws); Kate Levine, Note, If You Cannot Afford a Lawyer: Assessing the 
Constitutionality of Massachusetts’s Reimbursement Statute, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 191, 202–08 (2007) (discussing the rapid devolution of the right to 
counsel for indigent defendants once states were able to charge them attorney 
fees). Beyond the legal academy, sociologists and criminologists have conducted 
empirical research on the impact of monetary sanctions imposed by courts. See, 
e.g., Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social 
Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 AMER. J. SOC. 1753 (2010) 
(finding that monetary sanctions are imposed on a substantial majority of the 
millions of people convicted of crimes annually, and that this indebtedness 
reproduces disadvantage by reducing family income and increasing the 
likelihood of ongoing criminal justice involvement).  
 61. See JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS 11–13 (1986) 
(discussing the two modes of cognitive functioning: the paradigmatic or 
logico-scientific one that relies on abstract analysis and principled 
hypotheses, and the narrative one that leads instead to “good stories, 
gripping drama, believable (though not necessarily ‘true’) historical accounts”); 
see also Gregory S. Berns et al., Short- and Long-Term Effects of a Novel on 
Connectivity in the Brain, 3 BRAIN CONNECTIVITY 590 (2013) (finding that 
reading narratives has both a short- and long-term effect on the biology of the 
brain, and that reading a novel may cause changes in resting-state connectivity 
of the brain that persists for at least a few days); Paul J. Zak, Why Your Brain 
Loves Good Storytelling, HARV. BUS. REV. BLOG (Oct. 28, 2014), 
https://hbr.org/2014/10/why-your-brain-loves-good-storytelling/ (last visited Nov. 
11, 2015) (finding, based on the neurobiology of storytelling, that character-
driven stories with emotional content result in a better understanding of the 
writer or speaker’s thesis) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 62. See supra notes 20–31 and accompanying text (discussing David 
Ramirez); infra notes 255–270, 291–300 and accompanying text (describing case 
profiles). 
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perpetual cycle of coerced labor, has direct parallels in the 
two-tiered system of justice that exists in the juvenile and 
criminal courtrooms of today. Part II of the Article chronicles 
the legal history of peonage and the development of alternative 
mechanisms for coercing black labor after the passage of the 
Thirteenth Amendment and the Black Codes through the early 
twentieth century.63 Part III establishes the parallels to the 
present-day criminal justice system and argues that 
contemporary Supreme Court decisions intended to end the use of 
debtors’ prisons ultimately had limited impact.64 This analysis 
and the analogy to post-Civil War peonage does not depend upon 
a demonstration that the legislative motives during these two 
eras are precisely the same; it is enough to underscore the similar 
impact of the contemporary system in trapping momentarily 
errant individuals in an unyielding web of legal strictures. Part 
III also highlights the collateral consequences of criminal-justice 
debt for families as well as the fiscal impact and social costs that 
criminal-justice fees have on states.65 Part IV advances several 
commonsense proposals to end the phenomenon of the new 
peonage, beginning with data collection and impact analysis of 
fines, restitution, and user fees.66 It also considers proposals to 
establish the right to counsel in nonpayment hearings that can 
lead to incarceration or an extension of probation or parole, and it 
emphasizes the import of having states focus on rehabilitation 
through job training and placement, rather than the collection of 
criminal-justice fees or compulsory community service that 
interferes with employment. Part V concludes the Article.67 
II. Legal History of Peonage 
With the end of the Civil War and the passage of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, slavery ceased to be a formal system of 
labor control, but this dramatic political and legal change did not 
have much effect on the fundamental attitudes of dispossessed 
                                                                                                     
 63. See infra Part II (Legal History of Peonage). 
 64. See infra Part III (The New Peonage). 
 65. See infra Part III (The New Peonage). 
 66. See infra Part IV (Proposals for Reform). 
 67. See infra Part V (Conclusion). 
1610 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1595 (2015) 
slave owners.68 The subsequent creation of the “Black Codes” and 
the development of the system of peonage were undergirded by 
the belief of most Southern whites that they had a “proprietary 
interest in black labor and that blacks would not work unless 
coerced to do so.”69 As a result, slavery was replaced by the 
equally effective system of peonage.70 Although the latter lacked 
the extreme brutality and unyielding violence characterized by 
the former, the degradation that it unleashed upon the 
individual—at least in economic terms—was comparable.71 
Moreover, neither the federal government nor state legislatures 
put up much resistance to the shift from one system to another, 
enabling local court systems to actively “perpetuate the 
substance, if not the form, of black bondage.”72 As historian 
Douglas A. Blackmon has explained: 
By 1900, the South’s judicial system had been wholly 
reconfigured to make one of its primary purposes the coercion 
of African Americans. . . . Sentences were handed down by 
provincial judges, local mayors, and justices of the peace—
often men in the employ of white business owners who relied 
on the forced labor produced by the judgments. Dockets and 
trial records were inconsistently maintained. Attorneys 
were rarely involved on the side of blacks. Revenues from 
the neo-slavery poured the equivalent of tens of millions of 
dollars into the treasuries of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, 
Georgia, Florida, Texas, North Carolina, and South Carolina.73  
                                                                                                     
 68. See DANIEL A. NOVAK, THE WHEEL OF SERVITUDE: BLACK FORCED LABOR 
AFTER SLAVERY 1–3 (1978) (explaining that the South had “no intention of 
dealing with a truly free black labor force,” reflected by legislation that 
implemented criminal penalties for breach of labor contracts, gave rewards for 
law enforcement officers who returned black “laborers,” and imposed criminal 
penalties for “enticement of a servant”). 
 69. Klarman, supra note 53, at 928.  
 70. See NOVAK, supra note 68, at XV (“Without fanfare the freed slave was 
plunged into a new labor system [peonage] that degraded his value as a worker 
and made his new freedom a mockery, in economic terms at least.”). 
 71. See e.g., The New Slavery in the South—An Autobiography, supra note 
3 (“Really, we had made ourselves lifetime slaves, or peons, as the law called us. 
But, call it slavery, peonage, or what not, the truth is we lived in a hell on earth 
what time we spent in the Senator’s peon camp.”). 
 72. Klarman, supra note 53, at 921. 
 73. DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT 
OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 7–8 (2008). 
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Part II chronicles this legacy.74 
A. The Black Codes 
In 1864, the end of the Civil War meant four million newly 
freed slaves were released into a struggling economy.75 The war 
had disrupted the South’s industry and destroyed much of its 
property, and emancipated men were leaving plantations in 
droves.76 From the perspective of white farmers, merchants, and 
businessman, there was no clear mechanism for maintaining 
racial control while simultaneously reviving the economy and 
minimizing opportunities for active resistance or rebellion by 
former slaves.77 With the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment 
in 1865, tensions increased.78 
During the period of Reconstruction from 1863 to 1877, 
supervision by the federal government initially increased and 
then gradually lessened, eventually leaving the South free from 
interference except for the basic requirement that emancipation 
occur.79 While this period brought ostensibly “new” state 
legislatures and administrators, in reality these were the same 
men who had run, or at least reflected the values of, the Old 
South.80 For example, in its first postwar constitutional 
                                                                                                     
 74. See infra Part II (The New Peonage). 
 75. See generally, e.g., ANTOINETTE G. VAN ZELM, TENNESSEE CIVIL WAR 
NATIONAL HERITAGE AREA, HOPE WITHIN A WILDERNESS OF SUFFERING: THE 
TRANSITION FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND 
RECONSTRUCTION IN TENNESSEE, http://www.tn4me.org/pdf/Transition 
fromSlaverytoFreedom.pdf.  
 76. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 27 (2010) (laying out the conditions and mindset 
which existed in the Southern States immediately following the Civil War). 
 77. See id. (“Without the labor of former slaves, the region’s economy would 
surely collapse, and without the institution of slavery, there was no longer a 
formal mechanism for maintaining racial hierarchy and preventing 
‘amalgamation’ with a group of people considered intrinsically inferior and 
vile.”). 
 78. See generally NOVAK, supra note 68. 
 79. See NOVAK, supra note 68, at 1 (“Reconstruction left the South 
relatively free from interference from the federal government, save for the 
requirement that emancipation take place.”). 
 80. See id. at 1–2 (“Therefore, shortly after the end of the war, the 
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convention, Mississippi was guided by the following articulation 
of its mission:  
The institution of slavery having been destroyed . . . the 
legislature at its next session . . . shall provide by law for the 
protection and security of the person and property of the 
freedmen of the State, and guard them and the State against 
any evils that may arise from their sudden emancipation.81 
As a result, the laws passed during this “reconstructed” period of 
the Confederacy in 1865 and 1866 clearly reflected the fact that 
the South had “no intention of dealing with a truly free black 
labor force.”82 The Black Codes and the subsequent system of 
peonage or “debt slavery” were designed to fill the gap.83 
The Black Codes of 1865–1867, although short-lived and 
characterized by racially discriminatory terminology, presaged 
the system of peonage as the South’s answer to the Thirteenth 
Amendment.84 For instance, “An Act to Confer Civil Rights on 
Freedmen,” passed in Mississippi in 1865, barred blacks from 
renting land and farming on their own outside city limits; 
required every freedman to enter into a labor contract or face 
vagrancy charges; mandated arrest for breach of contract 
“without good cause”; prevented blacks from leaving one employ 
for another by imposing civil and criminal penalties for attempts 
to “entice” a laborer from his master; imposed criminal penalties 
for such malleable offenses as running away, displaying lewd 
behavior, and being an idle or disorderly person; allowed 
convicted blacks to be hired out at auctions in order to pay their 
fines and costs; and authorized a “head” tax on all blacks between 
the ages of eighteen and sixty, for which failure to pay was 
evidence of vagrancy, triggering further penalties.85  
                                                                                                     
Confederacy had ‘constructed’ itself with new state legislatures and 
administrations. It should be made clear, however, that the new legislators 
were, by and large, the same men who had run the Old South, or at least they 
reflected its values.”). 
 81. THEODORE BRANTNER WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH 63 
(1965). 
 82. NOVAK, supra note 68, at 2. 
 83. See id. (arguing that peonage and the Black Codes oppressed recently 
emancipated slaves).  
 84. See id. (“With formal slavery barred, a complex of laws setting up a 
system of peonage or debt slavery was formulated to fill the gap.”). 
 85. See id. at 2–3 (describing the Act to Confer Civil Rights on Freedmen). 
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Similar in intent, an Act to regulate “the Domestic Relations 
of Persons of Color” was passed in South Carolina in 1865.86 
Under this law, all labor contracts were enforced by sanctions; 
laborers needed their master’s written permission to leave the 
plantation or have visitors; freedmen could not operate a store or 
work as a craftsman without permission of the local justice of the 
peace and a fee payment of up to $100; failure to pay a poll tax 
was evidence of vagrancy; vagrancy was broadly defined; and a 
convicted vagrant could be hired out for the length of the 
sentence.87  
The leasing of convict labor also began during this period, 
initially to establish some means of control over prisoners, as 
most Southern penitentiaries had been destroyed during the 
war.88 In the early 1870s, convict leasing became profitable; it 
was reliable and cheap, and by the 1880s, it had reached its 
peak.89 As one Southern senator remarked, “No matter what goes 
wrong, you have no labor strike.”90 As a result, with no means to 
pay off their alleged “debts,” prisoners were sold as forced 
laborers to lumber camps, brickyards, railroads, farms, 
plantations and dozens of corporations throughout the South.91 
During this period, nine Southern states adopted vagrancy laws 
and eight enacted convict laws to allow for the leasing of county 
prisoners to plantation owners and private companies.92 
                                                                                                     
 86. Id. at 4. 
 87. See id. at 4–5 (enumerating the restrictions imposed on blacks by the 
Domestic Relations of Person of Color Act).  
 88. See id. at 31 (outlining the inception of convict leasing during the 
Reconstruction period, the first leasings “initiated by army commanders in the 
South,” and the shift in rationale from the desire to establish a temporary 
means of control over formerly-housed convicts to a profitable system of convict 
leases). 
 89. See id. at 32 (“By the mid-1880s the convict lease system had reached 
its peak. Convict labor was lauded as reliable and cheap by the happy exponents 
of entrepreneurial liberty in the ‘Redeemed’ South.”). 
 90. Id. at 33. 
 91. See ALEXANDER, supra note 76, at 31 (describing the custom of selling 
prisoners with debts as forced laborers to Southern industries). 
 92. See WILLIAM COHEN, AT FREEDOM’S EDGE: BLACK MOBILITY AND THE 
SOUTHERN WHITE QUEST FOR RACIAL CONTROL, 1861–1915 at 28–33 (1991) 
(asserting that the main objective of the convict laws was to “replace the labor 
controls of slavery and to limit the mobility of the black labor force” and that 
“states sought to control black mobility through the creation of an unobtrusive 
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It is notable that during Reconstruction, no Southern states 
passed laws that effectively dismantled the labor restrictions 
imposed by the Black Codes.93 Even in those states where what 
was derisively termed the “carpet-bagger-ignorant Negro 
coalition” was strong,94 they failed to establish a minimum wage, 
provide for oversight of employers’ debt calculations, or offer legal 
review of criminal charges brought against emancipated slaves.95 
Instead of directing their energies to labor rights, the 
Reconstruction Congress in Washington focused its chief 
attention on the broadest and most basic interpretation of civil 
rights: ending slavery with the passage of the Thirteenth 
Amendment; giving full citizenship to blacks with the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866;96 establishing suffrage (at least in theory) for 
black men with the Fifteenth Amendment; and making 
interference with voting a federal offense and violent 
infringement of civil rights a crime within the Ku Klux Klan 
Acts.97  
With little Congressional appetite to regulate the coercive 
systems of labor that developed during the periods of 
Reconstruction and what Southerners termed “Redemption,”98 
                                                                                                     
legal structure that could be selectively applied”). 
 93. See id. at 35 (“If laws did not manifest obvious discrimination against 
the freedmen, they often survived.”). 
 94. NOVAK, supra note 68, at 19. 
 95. See id. at 18 (describing the lack of any legislative efforts resembling 
those mentioned in the text, which “were just the sort of legislation which ought 
to have come from [state legislatures]”). 
 96. See CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, 14 STAT. 27 (1866) (amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
(1991)) (proclaiming that “all persons born in the United States . . . are hereby 
declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and 
color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary 
servitude” shall enjoy equal benefits and burdens of citizenship therein). 
 97. See ENFORCEMENT ACT, 17 STAT. 13 (1871) (as amended by 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (1979)) (“Any person who . . . shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any 
person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any 
[constitutional guarantees] shall . . . be liable to the party injured in any 
action . . . or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”). Southern legislatures 
also began to address matters related to the implementation of desegregation 
and the establishment of public education. NOVAK, supra note 68, at 18–19. 
 98. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 
1863–1877 at 587–601 (Harper Perennial 2014) (1988); see also Freedom: A 
History of the US, A Failed Revolution, PBS (2002), http://www.pbs.org/wnet 
/historyofus/web07/segment5_p.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (describing 
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sharecropping became the norm for agricultural laborers.99 After 
the war, there was a shortage of cash. Former slaves were 
typically paid half in currency, with the other half to be paid only 
when the crop was harvested.100 If basic goods were lent to the 
former slave, the employer (a planter or merchant) placed a lien 
on the crops, so that even if the crops were abundant enough to 
remove the worker’s outstanding debts, he would still need to 
borrow again to survive the winter.101 Under another scenario, 
the planter subtracted the costs of food, clothing, and shelter from 
the worker’s wages, but because the planter unilaterally set the 
value of such goods, the “sentence” could be made to run a year or 
more.102 Moreover, emancipated slaves had little bargaining 
power to negotiate the terms of their labor contracts, and 
although any breach of contract by the employer was a 
punishable offense, very few employers were ever prosecuted 
under the statute.103 Because of “enticement” laws, employers 
could not “entice away” another’s employees, and most workers 
lacked the means to relocate either within the South or to the 
North, the result of Southern white efforts to “circumscribe black 
freedom of movement.”104 Laborers also found themselves trapped 
                                                                                                     
Redemption as a movement during the 1860s–1890s by Southern Democrats 
who used the Black Codes, violence, and voter disenfranchisement laws to keep 
blacks and Republicans out of power) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 99. See COHEN, supra note 92, at 19 (“As the system developed, 
sharecropping began to emerge as the dominant means of organizing Southern 
agricultural labor . . . .”).  
 100. See id. (explaining that after the Civil War there was “an acute 
shortage of cash, which led to the rise of an arrangement whereby the workers 
agreed to accept as wages a portion of the crop to be distributed at the end of the 
season”). 
 101. See NOVAK, supra note 68, at 19 (describing the establishment of 
sharecropping and the rise of the lien instrument as “an instrument by which 
[black sharecroppers were] bound to the land”). 
 102. See id. at 35 (“As the planter set the value of [food, clothing, and 
shelter], with a little judicious bookkeeping the sentence could easily be made to 
run a year or more.”). 
 103. See id. at 20 (“Theoretically, the fact that the planter was subject to any 
punishment for breach of contract was an advancement over the provision in the 
Black Codes. As a practical matter, it had little meaning, since employers were 
simply not prosecuted under the statute.”). 
 104. See COHEN, supra note 92, at xiii (explaining that a foundational goal of 
his book was to tell the story of black mobility “against the background of 
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within the strictures of the “fine-cost” system, with one study 
finding that in a single month in a Georgia county, 149 people 
(almost all blacks) were sentenced to a total of nineteen years of 
labor for “crimes no more serious than walking on the grass or 
spitting on the sidewalk.”105  
In short, during Reconstruction, “the newly freed agricultural 
worker was, by consensus, placed in a position of peonage,”106 
with the laws themselves—affirmed by the local courts—ensuring 
this result. Because every state had a provision in its constitution 
barring imprisonment for debt, the validity of these laws relied 
on the argument that fraudulent intent—or having false 
pretenses—when entering into the contract was the object of the 
penalty, rather than the breach itself.107 In this way, courts 
asserted that the peonage system was not the equivalent of 
involuntary servitude because although the employer could not 
force the worker to stay, the worker could be punished for 
leaving.108 This conclusion was supported by the fact that the 
laws stipulated that the mere failure to adhere to the contract 
was presumptive evidence of false pretenses or fraud at its 
inception.109 Of course, “[t]his assessment ignored the fact that 
the statute provided that imprisonment did not relieve the debt; 
punishment could continue indefinitely until the contract 
provisions had been met.”110  
For decades after the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
the federal government did nothing to stop the progress of 
                                                                                                     
southern white efforts to circumscribe black freedom of movement” through the 
use of labor-control laws). 
 105. See NOVAK, supra note 68, at 35 (discussing the findings of Judge 
Emory Speer, a “bitter opponent of peonage” whose personal survey of the Bibb 
County, Georgia court records found the results displayed in the accompanying 
text). 
 106. Id. at 28. 
 107. See id. at 38 (“This interpretation (punishing fraud rather than breach), 
is absolutely vital to the validity of these laws, for every state had a provision in 
its constitution barring imprisonment for debt.”). 
 108. See id. (detailing the argument by which courts cited the “voluntary” 
nature of the system in place, claiming that employers could not prevent 
workers from leaving, and thus all employers and courts could do was punish a 
worker after the fact). 
 109. See id. (“Failure to perform the services contracted for was presumptive 
evidence of fraud.”). 
 110. Id. at 39. 
THE NEW PEONAGE 1617 
peonage practices. State laws enforcing peonage were not 
challenged in the courts, and the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867, aimed 
originally at the system of peonage that existed in New Mexico 
while under Spanish rule, was rarely, if ever, invoked.111 By the 
early 1900s, however, the Progressive Movement became more 
interested in the plight of blacks, including those working under 
debt contracts.112 With new waves of immigration, whites were 
brought into the labor pool and made peons, and the U.S. Senate 
became motivated to examine the practice.113 After a lone 
Alabama judge declared one of several peonage laws 
unconstitutional,114 the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Clyatt115 acknowledged that peonage unconstitutionally allows for 
punishment on the basis of debt.116 Between 1905 and 1911, 
Clyatt opened the way for lower federal courts to find that the 
Anti-Peonage Act applied to a wide variety of scenarios.117 Yet, 
states vigorously defended their labor laws and continued to 
uphold their contract and enticement laws as valid exercises of 
                                                                                                     
 111. See id. at 36, 44 (explaining the origin of the Spanish peonage system 
in the New Mexico territory, its incorporation into U.S. law in 1846, and the 
subsequent targeting of it by the first anti-peonage legislation). 
 112. See id. at 46 (explaining the increased interest of the federal 
government in “the plight of the Southern peon” at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the rise of the Progressive Movement and the writings of Ray 
Stannard Baker, and the “agitation over lynchings of blacks in the South”). 
 113. See id. (describing the actions of the Senate in examining the United 
States Immigration Commission and introducing legislation in favor of 
immigrants in response to the trend of white immigrants being subjected to 
peonage). 
 114. See id. at 48–49 (chronicling the holdings of one Judge Thomas G. 
Jones in his methodical rejection of peonage laws, culminating in a 1903 
decision where he declared an Alabama contract-enticement act 
unconstitutional). 
 115. 197 U.S. 201 (1905). 
 116. See id. at 215–17 (describing the operation of the peonage system 
through “contracting to pay [one’s] indebtedness through labor or servitude” and 
discussing the scope of constitutional authority over the system, ultimately 
determining that such a system is contravenes the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments); see also NOVAK, supra note 68, at 51 (discussing the 
unconstitutionality of peonage through the decisions of several courts). 
 117. See NOVAK, supra note 68, at 52 (detailing the court’s holding that the 
Anti-Peonage Act applies to cases of debtor coercion, employer bribes and fraud, 
employer imprisonment and procurement of servants, false accusations of laborers 
by employers, and magistrate or officer involvement in knowingly-fraudulent 
arrests and convictions). 
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state power, setting the stage for the Supreme Court to weigh in, 
as it did with Bailey v. Alabama in 1911.118  
B. Bailey v. Alabama and United States v. Reynolds 
In Alabama in December, 1907, Alonzo Bailey, a black man, 
entered into an annual contract as a farm laborer with the 
Riverside Company for twelve dollars a month.119 He received an 
advance of fifteen dollars to be deducted in monthly installments, 
but he left after working for six weeks and without returning the 
advance.120 The Riverside Company had Bailey arrested under 
the state’s false pretenses law, which allowed for the presumption 
of fraudulent intent, and an Alabama evidentiary rule prohibited 
laborers indicted under this law to testify to their 
“uncommunicated motives.”121 Given these evidentiary 
roadblocks for defendants, it is unsurprising that Bailey was 
readily convicted, with the only witness against him being “his 
white employer with the contract in his hand—which, by the way, 
was an unacknowledged and unwitnessed contract.”122 Not 
having the money, Bailey was sentenced to 136 days of hard 
labor: twenty days for the $30 fine plus 116 days to cover his 
                                                                                                     
 118. 219 U.S. 219 (1911). 
 119. See id. at 229 (describing the initial employment agreement entered 
into by Bailey). 
 120. See Bailey, 219 U.S. at 229 (describing the events that led to the case); 
see also COHEN, supra note 92, at 288 (“[Bailey] was given an advance of fifteen 
dollars to be taken out of his monthly pay. When after working for just over a 
month, he left without refunding the advance, the Riverside Company had 
Bailey arrested . . . .”). 
 121. See id. (explaining the “read-in” enforcement of the evidentiary statute, 
and its practical effect “that the accused, for the purpose of rebutting the 
statutory presumption, shall not be allowed to testify ‘as to his uncommunicated 
motives, purpose, or intention’” (quoting Bailey v. State, 161 Ala. 77, 78 (1909))). 
The legislatures of Georgia in 1903 and Florida in 1907 passed similar statutes 
that allowed for breach of contract to be prima facie evidence of the worker’s 
intent to injure or defraud the employer. See PETE DANIEL, THE SHADOW OF 
SLAVERY: PEONAGE IN THE SOUTH, 1901–1969 at 67 (1972) (detailing the 
development of Southern legislation that facilitated the peonage system).  
 122. Ray Stannard Baker, A Pawn in the Struggle for Freedom, AM. MAG. 72, 
Sept. 1911, at 609.  
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court costs and lawyers’ fees.123 As Booker T. Washington said of 
the Alabama law at the time: 
This simply means that any white man, who cares to charge 
that a Colored man has promised to work for him and has not 
done so, or who has gotten money from him and not paid it 
back, can have the Colored man sent to the chain gang.124  
Bailey unsuccessfully appealed his case to the Alabama 
Supreme Court, and by 1911 the case had reached the U.S. 
Supreme Court.125 His lawyers argued that the statute’s true 
intent was “to enable the employer to keep the employee in 
involuntary servitude by the overhanging menace of 
prosecution.”126 The lawyers representing Alabama argued that 
allowing a simple breach of contract to serve as prima facie 
evidence of fraud did not “overcome” the absolute presumption of 
innocence for all defendants and the rigorous standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.127 The Court rejected this argument 
and held in an opinion by Associate Justice Charles Evans 
Hughes that the state could not punish a servant for failure or 
refusal to serve out his contract based on the presumption that he 
had entered the contract under false pretenses.128 Although the 
Court refused to acknowledge that the law was racially 
discriminatory,129 it recognized that the statute was—in 
essence—the legal cornerstone of peonage and invalidated it:130 
                                                                                                     
 123. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 231; COHEN, supra note 92, at 288.  
 124. DANIEL, supra note 121, at 67. 
 125. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 231 (1911). 
 126. COHEN, supra note 92, at 288.  
 127. See id. at 289 (describing the argument and labeling it as 
“disingenuous”). 
 128. See Bailey, 219 U.S. 244 (“If [the State] cannot punish the servant as a 
criminal for the mere failure or refusal to serve without paying his debt, it is not 
permitted to accomplish the same result by creating a statutory presumption 
which, upon proof of no other fact, exposes him to conviction and punishment.”). 
But see Bailey, 219 U.S. at 246 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Breach of a legal 
contract without excuse is wrong conduct, even if the contract is for labor, and if 
a state adds to civil liability a criminal liability to fine, it simply intensifies the 
legal motive for doing right; it does not make the laborer a slave.”). 
 129. See Bailey, 219 U.S. at 244 (“The statute, on its face, makes no racial 
discrimination, and the record fails to show its existence in fact. No question of a 
sectional character is presented, and we may view the legislation in the same 
manner as if it had been enacted in New York or in Idaho.”). 
 130. See COHEN, supra note 92, at 289 (“‘[A]lthough the statute in terms is to 
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It is the compulsion of the service that the [Alabama] statute 
inhibits, for when that occurs the condition of servitude is 
created, which would be not less involuntary because of the 
original agreement to work out the indebtedness. The contract 
exposes the debtor to liability for the loss due to the breach, 
but not to enforced labor.131  
Three years later in United States v. Reynolds,132 the Court, in 
an opinion by Associate Justice William R. Day, utilized the same 
reasoning and strategy to strike down Alabama’s criminal-surety 
statute.133 Ed Rivers, a black man, was convicted in Alabama of 
larceny, fined $15 and assessed costs of $43.75.134 J.A. Reynolds 
appeared as a surety for him and paid the amount of the fine and 
costs to the state.135 On May 4, 1910, Rivers contracted with 
Reynolds to work as his farmhand for nine months and twenty-
eight days at the rate of $6 per month in order to pay off the fines 
and costs.136 On June 6th, Rivers quit the job, and was arrested, 
charged with violation of a “criminal contract,” convicted, and 
fined $87.137 At this point, Gideon W. Broughton, a neighboring 
planter, served as the surety and entered into a similar contract 
with Rivers to work as a farmhand for fourteen months to pay off 
his fines.138 Rivers fled from Broughton after a few days, 
incurring a new fine of $300 dollars plus $112 in costs, and was 
                                                                                                     
punish fraud, still its natural and inevitable effect is to expose to conviction for 
crime those who simply fail or refuse to perform contracts for personal service in 
liquidation of a debt.’” (quoting Bailey, 219 U.S. at 231)). 
 131. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 242 (1911) (emphasis added). 
 132. 235 U.S. 133 (1914). 
 133. See id. at 144 (“‘[P]eonage, however created, is compulsory service, 
involuntary servitude . . . . A clear distinction exists between peonage and the 
voluntary performance of labor or rendering services in payment of debt.’” 
(quoting Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 215)). See also id. at 150 (Holmes, J., concurring) 
There seems to me nothing in the Thirteenth Amendment or the Revised 
Statutes that prevents a state from making a breach of contract, as well a 
reasonable contract for labor as for other matters, a crime and punishing 
it as such. But impulsive people with little intelligence or foresight may be 
expected to lay hold of anything that affords a relief from present pain, 
even though it will cause greater trouble by and by. 
 134. Id. at 139. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 140. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id.  
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ultimately sentenced to one year on the chain gang, as it was 
apparent that he would not remain on a farm “even when 
threatened with continual arrest.”139 The federal district court 
held that this cycle of entrapping Rivers did not violate the Anti-
Peonage Act and that the Alabama Code justified his punitive 
treatment.140 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that under 
such contracts, 
labor is performed under the constant coercion and threat of 
another possible arrest and prosecution in case he violates the 
labor contract which he has made with the surety, and this 
form of coercion is as potent as it would have been had the law 
provided for the seizure and compulsory service of the 
convict. . . . Under this statute, the surety may cause the 
arrest of the convict for violation of his labor contract. He may 
be sentenced and punished for this new offense, and undertake 
to liquidate the penalty by a new contract of a similar nature, 
and, if again broken, may be again prosecuted, and the convict 
is thus kept chained to an ever-turning wheel of servitude to 
discharge the obligation which he has incurred to his surety, 
who has entered into an undertaking with the State or paid 
money in his behalf.141  
Despite these Supreme Court decisions striking down key 
aspects of the practice, peonage continued—not only in Alabama 
but throughout the South.142 The labor contract laws of Georgia 
and Florida, for instance, remained on the books for another 
thirty years, as did the legal basis for the practice.143 In a 
magazine essay written after Bailey was decided in 1911, the 
author characterized Alonzo Bailey as “a mere pawn in the 
                                                                                                     
 139. DANIEL, supra note 121, at 26–27. 
 140. See United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 140–41 (1914) (“The 
rulings in the court below upon the plea and demurrers were that there was no 
violation of the Federal statutes, properly construed, and also held that the 
conduct of the defendants was justified by the provisions of the Alabama Code, 
upon which they relied.”). 
 141. Id. at 146. 
 142. See DANIEL, supra note 121, at 79 (discussing the continuation and 
evolution of Southern peonage after the Reynolds and Bailey decisions). 
 143. See id. at 80 (“[N]either the Justice Department nor a civil rights or 
labor group finished what Bailey’s supporters began in 1911. Peonage continued 
to the 1940s and beyond, and the legal basis for the practice endured thirty 
years after the precedent-setting Bailey case had been decided.”).  
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battle,” and asserted that the eponymous Supreme Court case “is 
no final panacea”: 
Neither individual men nor races rise merely by decisions or 
laws. While so many Negroes are . . . poverty stricken, and 
while so many white men are shortsighted enough to take 
advantage of this . . . poverty, so long will forms of slavery 
prevail . . . .144 
Although there were few thorough investigations or even 
approximate estimates of the number of blacks who fell prey to 
peonage, there was little doubt that the practice was prevalent 
and that it operated to perpetuate black exploitation.145 A.J. 
Hoyt, an investigator for the Department of Justice, sarcastically 
remarked in 1907 that in the three states of Georgia, Alabama, 
and Mississippi, “investigations will prove that 33 1/3 percent of 
the planters operating from five to one hundred plows, are 
holding their Negro employees to a condition of peonage, and 
arresting and returning those that leave before alleged 
indebtedness is paid.”146 In the same year, a citizen in Florida 
remarked, “Slavery is just as much an ‘institution’ now as it was 
before the war.”147 
Yet, the perpetuation of such a system would not have been 
possible without the complicity of the judicial system, which kept 
the wheel of servitude turning. As Langston Hughes wrote in 
1931: 
                                                                                                     
 144. Baker, supra note 122, at 610. 
 145. See DANIEL, supra note 121, at 20 (“Documentary evidence of peonage 
in the nineteenth century remains sketchy, for few observers were familiar with 
what constituted peonage. Yet from travelers’ accounts, official reports, 
congressional hearings, and other sources, there is strong evidence that peonage 
was no twentieth-century invention.”). 
 146. Id. at 22, 108–09. Hoyt, of course, was referring to the three-fifths 
compromise that was reached between delegates from the South and the North 
during the 1787 U.S. Constitutional Convention over how slaves would be 
counted when determining a state’s total population for legislative 
representation and taxing purposes. See Brooke E. Newborn, Correcting the 
Common Misreading of the “Three-Fifths” Clause of the U.S. Constitution: 
Clarifying the “Hostile Faction”, 80 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 93, 96–97 (2009) (explaining 
the process of arriving at the compromise and the meaning of it). The ultimate 
agreement was that persons who were not free, “including those bound to 
Service for a Term of Years,” would be counted as “three fifths of all other 
Persons.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, ¶ 3. 
 147. DANIEL, supra note 121, at 22 (emphasis in original). 
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That Justice is a blind goddess 
Is a thing to which we poor are wise: 
Her bandage hides two festering sores 
That once, perhaps, were eyes.148 
The next section explores the central role of the Southern judicial 
system in sustaining the peonage regime.  
C. The Complicity of the Judicial System 
By the twentieth century, peonage in the South had 
developed into a “confusing mass of customs, legalities, and 
pseudo-legalities,”149 which the judicial system had enabled to 
flourish.150 Despite the Anti-Peonage Act and landmark Supreme 
Court decisions in Bailey and Reynolds,151 most Southerners 
“acquiesced in or approved of” peonage, either because they did 
not perceive it to be morally or ethically wrong or because it was 
“shrouded in overtones of legality and made respectable by the 
approval of community rules.”152 In this way, “public support for 
the practice made [criminal] investigations difficult and [peonage] 
convictions rare.”153 
With the complicity of law enforcement, court 
administrators, and all-white juries, the South effectively 
nullified anti-peonage legislation and appellate case decisions, 
                                                                                                     
 148. Langston Hughes, Justice, in THE NEW MASSES 15 (1931). See also 
ROBERT SHULMAN, THE POWER OF POLITICAL ART: THE 1930S LITERARY LEFT 
RECONSIDERED 248–50 (2000) (explaining that in the 1923 version of the poem, 
Hughes had written, “ . . . we black are wise . . .” and discussing the possible 
reasons for the textual change from “black” to “poor” in the later versions).  
 149. DANIEL, supra note 121, at 25. 
 150. See id. at 25–26 (describing how “much peonage stemmed from custom, 
not law” and giving examples of blacks settling purported contract debts with 
“no aid from a court” as they became peons—additionally, “court-approved 
contract with prisoners proved even more vicious” in perpetuating the custom of 
peonage). 
 151. See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court 
and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
646, 708 (1982) (calling Bailey and Reynolds “landmarks in the slow process of 
exorcising the vestiges of slavery from American law”). 
 152. DANIEL, supra note 121, at 23. 
 153. Id. 
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replacing them with local custom.154 Law enforcement officials 
arrested blacks for manufactured crimes, such as vagrancy or 
engaging in loud talk with white women, and held them in local 
jails; judges, mayors, and justices of the peace working for—or 
getting kickbacks from—the business owners who benefitted from 
the labor entered sentences comprised of fees and costs; laborers 
then made informal settlements with the business owners to pay 
their debts, real or imagined, in exchange for their release; and so 
on.155 These “cases” rarely made it into a courtroom, and when 
they did, attorneys almost never represented blacks, and court 
dockets and other record-keeping was poor, if not nonexistent.156 
As a result, the eight Southern states, where more than 
seventy-five percent of the black population lived, had their 
coffers filled with the bounty extracted from former slaves and 
their descendants via the peonage system.157 
While the informal agreements between planters and 
workers negotiated through the bars of a local jail cell were 
clearly exploitative, the formal contracts—the breach of which 
was litigated in court—could be even more punitive.158 Ed Rivers, 
for instance, of United States v. Reynolds, 159 ultimately served a 
year on a chain gang for the act of simple breach of contract but 
would have served only two months in jail if he had opted for that 
                                                                                                     
 154. See id. at 25 (describing the norm of corrupt practices among local law 
enforcement, the similarities between Southern legislation and the Black Codes, 
the lack of court advisement in the settlement of purported contract debts, and 
other state and local law regimes that “favored employers”). 
 155. See Mae C. Quinn, In Loco Juvenile Justice: Minors in Munis Cash 
from Kids, and Adolescent Pro Se Advocacy Ferguson and Beyond, BYU L. REV. 
(forthcoming Dec. 2015) (discussing that many justices of the peace received jobs 
“as a result of political patronage or by offering special treatment to influential 
community members,” and were “paid from fines and fees they were able to 
collect from litigants, raising questions about their objectivity”). 
 156. BLACKMON, supra note 73, at 7–8 (discussing the reconfiguration of the 
South’s court system at the turn of the twentieth century that allowed 
landowners to coerce African Americans into labor contracts). 
 157. See id. (describing the prevalence of labor contracts that former slaves 
were forced to accept).  
 158. See DANIEL, supra note 121, at 26 (explaining the punitive nature of 
formal sharecropping contract construction, as well as general court sympathy 
for that system). 
 159. See supra notes 133–142 and accompanying text (describing the facts 
and holding of United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914)). 
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penalty when he had first pled guilty in court to larceny.160 
Federal employees assigned to investigate allegations of peonage 
often displayed an “apathy or acquiescence” regarding the 
system, and Southern juries were notorious for having no 
sympathy for blacks alleging that they were entrapped by 
peonage.161 One Justice Department official in Florida explained 
his failure to sustain a conviction in a peonage case resulted from 
the fact that “no white jury will convict a white man for anything 
he might do to a Negro.”162  
In the decades to follow, despite the migration of thousands 
of blacks to the North, the growth of the industrial economy 
during World War I, and the introduction of the mechanization of 
agriculture, patterns of exploitation continued among Southern 
laborers.163 In the 1920s, many planters still considered blacks to 
be no more than private property.164 Complaints filed with the 
NAACP and the Department of Justice confirm that black 
laborers were not only subjected to peonage but to acts of physical 
brutality by white employers in an attempt to coerce them to 
continue working.165 By 1945, sources suggest that although 
peonage had diminished, reports of abuses continued—many of 
them from outside the South.166 A Senate Subcommittee heard 
testimony in 1951 that peonage had “yet to be obliterated” in 
                                                                                                     
 160. See DANIEL, supra note 121, at 27 (“Had Rivers chosen jail when he had 
first pled guilty to petit larceny, he would have served only about two months.”). 
 161. See id. at 32–33 (explaining the dismissal of a case in which the 
attorney successfully argued for dismissal because the witnesses were 
“principally negroes,” and detailing the notoriety of Southern juries’ prejudice 
against the enforcement of peonage laws through the report of U.S. Attorney 
William Armbrecht). 
 162. Id. at 33. 
 163. See id. at 132 (discussing the continued exploitation of blacks in the 
1900s). 
 164. See id. (“[F]ederal apathy, local customs, and community acquiescence 
allowed peonage to exist almost unhindered in the 1920s as it had a generation 
earlier.”). 
 165. See id. (discussing that the efforts of the NAACP, U.S. field attorneys, 
and victims in reporting abuses could not dislodge peonage from its roots in 
Southern local customs). 
 166. See id. at 186 (“Since 1945, these sources present a picture . . . which 
suggests that peonage certainly diminished; but to what degree it persisted is 
impossible to determine. Reports of such abuses continued, and many of the 
reports came from outside the State.”). 
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Georgia.167 The 1961 Commission on Civil Rights reported that 
the Department of Justice had received sixty-seven complaints of 
peonage or slavery between 1958 and 1960.168 In 1969, there was 
evidence that peonage persisted among groups of foreign workers 
who had emigrated from Central and South America to Southern 
farms and turpentine camps.169 As the historian Pete Daniel has 
written: “Like the Mississippi River floods, the incidence of 
peonage rose and fell, unpredictable, violent, inexorable.”170 
Such was the judicial system’s abandonment of African 
Americans. Unfortunately, there are disturbing parallels to the 
legal system of today: we still incarcerate people for debt, and 
those people are disproportionately people of color. 
III. The New Peonage 
There are typically two types of debt that lead to court action 
and the risk of incarceration. The first is private debt resulting 
from unpaid credit card balances, medical bills, car payments, 
and payday loans and other high-interest, short-term cash 
advances relied upon by low-income people; this type of debt can 
result in the creditor or a debt collector suing the debtor in civil 
court.171 If the debtor does not appear or the court decides that 
the failure to pay is “willful,” the court can issue an arrest 
warrant for criminal contempt and incarcerate the defendant 
until she posts bond or pays the debt in full.172 
                                                                                                     
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 188. 
 169. See id. at 190 (“[A] 1969 federal anti-poverty pamphlet . . . noted that 
‘semi-feudal conditions’ existed in the turpentine camps of the South. Advances 
were given and were difficult to pay off, so tenants moved off . . . because they 
were instructed to remain on the farms until they had paid their debts.”). 
 170. Id. at 149. 
 171. See O. Randolph Bragg & Daniel Edelman, Fair Debt Collection: The 
Need for Private Enforcement, 7 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 89, 90–93 (1994–1995) 
(explaining the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, private debt, and the actions 
that debt collectors can take to recover the debt).  
 172. See Cammett, supra note 60, at 403 (explaining how failure to pay 
private debt can lead to incarceration in some circumstances, such as defying a 
court order or failing to show up in court). See also Lea Shepard, Creditors’ 
Contempt, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1509, 1527 (2011) 
Any effective debt collection technique relies on coercion: the ability of a 
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The second type of debt is legal financial obligations (LFOs), 
which court systems impose upon criminal defendants in three 
categories: fines or monetary penalties as a condition of the 
sentence to punish for the commission of the criminal offense 
itself; restitution to compensate victims for their calculable 
losses; and user fees to raise revenue for the state.173 Included 
within the last group are fees that can be assessed at virtually 
every stage of the case, beginning with the application fee for a 
public defender and including some or all of the following: a jail 
per diem fee for pretrial incarceration; a fine “surcharge”; 
administrative fees and costs; prosecution reimbursement fees; 
investigation fees; jail fees for the post-trial or post-plea 
sentence;174 probation or parole fees;175 drug testing fees; vehicle 
interlock device fees for driving under the influence convictions; 
fees for mandatory drug, alcohol or mental health treatment; and, 
of course, interest fees, which can be compounded, on all unpaid 
legal debts.176 User fees are increasingly administered by private 
probation companies that pass on the cost of their services to the 
offender; the failure to make these payments can result in 
incarceration that is served in addition to any jail or prison 
sentence imposed for the offense itself.177 
                                                                                                     
creditor to make credible threats to extract payment from 
debtors. . . . Courts presiding over in personam actions compel debtors to 
show up in court and provide information about their assets or to turn 
over money or property to creditors by threatening to deprive debtors of 
their liberty. 
 173. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 4, 7–10 (describing the three 
categories of LFOs). 
 174. Such costs are billed to inmates in forty-one states. Joseph Shapiro, As 
Court Fees Rise, the Poor are Paying the Price, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED 
(May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-
court-fees-punish-the-poor (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 175. These are billed to inmates in forty-four states. Id.; see also Paul 
Peterson, Supervision Fees: State Policies and Practice, 76 FED. PROBATION 40, 
40 (2012) (noting that in 1997 at least forty states charged supervision fees, 
which is part of a trend that has increased). 
 176. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 4, 7–10 (displaying a set of 
graphics that shows which fees may apply at various stages in a State’s judicial 
process). 
 177. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: AMERICA’S 
“OFFENDER-FUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY 1–6 (2014) (finding that over 1,000 
courts across the U.S. inflict patterns of abusive collection tactics and financial 
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The profile of the typical criminal defendant in terms of 
socioeconomic status, race, and educational attainment, is very 
different from that of the average U.S citizen. When a middle or 
upper income person receives a court fee or fine, most can readily 
pay it, ending their contact with the system; in contrast, 
empirical data confirms the following regarding the majority of 
defendants: they are overwhelmingly poor, with most qualifying 
for indigent defense; large percentages do not have a high school 
diploma; they function at the lowest literacy levels; and they are 
disproportionately people of color.178 Given this reality, for the 
typical criminal defendant or young person in delinquency court, 
a single court-imposed fee or fine can trigger a chain reaction that 
leads inexorably to a whole host of potentially disastrous 
complications, including, but not limited to, incarceration.179 
This Part proceeds in five sections. First, it sets out the 
relevant case law governing criminal-justice debt since the 
Supreme Court decisions in Bailey and Reynolds; then it fleshes 
out the impact of LFOs on juveniles, families, and the state; 
finally, it concludes with a discussion of the ways in which the 
peonage system of the post-Civil War era parallels the new 
peonage of today. 
A. Constitutional Protections and Limitations 
Although the U.S. Congress abolished debtors’ prisons under 
federal law in the 1830s,180 with twelve states following suit 
                                                                                                     
hardship using an “offender-funded” model of privatized probation). 
 178. See ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 38, at 10 (detailing a Ninth 
Circuit finding that “African-Americans and Latinos in [Washington] were 
disproportionately arrested for drug possession and delivery, far more likely to 
be searched, and less likely to be released than their white counterparts. These 
same disparities extend to the assessment of LFOs . . . .”). 
 179. See Rebecca Vallas & Roopal Patel, Sentenced to a Life of Criminal 
Debt: A Barrier to Reentry and Climbing Out of Poverty, 46 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 
J. POVERTY & POL’Y 131, 131 (2012) (emphasizing the damage that can result 
from criminal-justice debt). 
 180. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws in the 
United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 16 (1995) (explaining that the 
practice of imprisoning people for debt was abolished at the federal level in 
1833). But see 25 Cong. ch. 35, Feb. 28, 1839, 5 Stat. 321 (1839) (providing in 
1839 that federal courts would follow the laws abolishing imprisonment for debt 
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between 1821 and 1849 and the majority of states discontinuing 
the practice by the 1870s,181 the practice has persisted to the 
present, as state constitutional and statutory bans on 
imprisonment for debt typically exempt crime from their scope.182 
Therefore, jail time is not prohibited for such noncommercial 
debts as those stemming from criminal court involvement and 
those stemming from failure to pay child support or alimony,183 
and it is not prohibited for contractual debts stemming from civil 
contempt orders.184 Not surprisingly, these developments have 
coincided with the rise of mass incarceration. During the 1970s 
and 1980s, there was a dramatic increase in the number of state 
statutes allowing for incarceration as a penalty for debt,185 and in 
                                                                                                     
within the states in which they sat). 
 181. See Tabb, supra note 180, at 16 (noting that many states abolished the 
practice of imprisoning people for debt during the 1830s and 1840s). For a 
history of debtors’ prisons in the U.S., see generally PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS 
AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA (1974); BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS (2009); 
DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION (2001); CHARLES WARRANT, BANKRUPTCY IN 
UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935). See also MARGOT C. FINN, THE CHARACTER OF 
CREDIT 109–96 (2003) (providing a history of imprisonment for debt in Europe). 
 182. See Cammett, supra note 60, at 382–84 (asserting that “States run 
afoul of the spirit, if not the constitutional requirements, of Bearden [which 
abolished debtor’s prisons] in a variety of ways” including conditional criminal 
justice debt and programs that allow the reduction of debt through served jail 
time). 
 183. See Richard E. James, Putting Fear Back into the Law and Debtors 
Back into Prison: Reforming the Debtors’ Prison System, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 143, 
165–67 (2002) (describing current examples of state court practices that 
represent a “de facto debtor’s prison system” that keeps noncommercial debtors 
accountable to courts and avoids unconstitutionality). Incarceration is also 
allowed for such noncommercial debts as those stemming from tort and from tax 
and licensing fees. Id.  
 184. See, e.g., Press Release, Payday Businesses Unlawfully File 1500 
Criminal Complaints Against Borrowers to Collect Money, TEX. APPLESEED (Dec. 
17, 2014), https://www.texasappleseed.org/press-releases?field_featured_value 
=All&field_status_value=All&field_multi_project_association_target_id_entityre
ference_filter=72&field_status_value_1_op=or&field_status_value_1=All&=Appl
y (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (condemning the practice of courts issuing civil 
contempt orders on behalf of payday loan businesses in order to enforce 
contractual debt, as it creates a de facto debtors’ prison regime) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 185. See BANNON ET AL. supra note 37, at 19 (detailing the evolution of 
Supreme Court precedent holding that “debtor’s prison can be used to collect 
criminal justice debt only when a person has the ability to make payments but 
refuses to do so”); see also Arthur J. Goldberg, Equality and Governmental 
Action, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 205, 221 (1964) (“The ‘choice’ of paying $100 fine or 
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the late 1980s and early 1990s, state and county rules 
increasingly allowed for jail time for failure to pay monies owed 
to private creditors as well as court fines and fees.186 With the 
fiscal crisis of the 2000s, states faced growing budget deficits, and 
court systems—municipal, county, and state level—were under 
pressure to be fiscally self-supporting.187 Using the threat of 
incarceration to pressure low-income people to pay off their debts 
has become a common strategy of the criminal justice system.188  
Since 1970, the U.S. Supreme Court has relied upon the 
Fourteenth Amendment in three cases to affirm the 
unconstitutionality of incarcerating those too poor to pay their 
debts.189 In Williams v. Illinois,190 the appellant, Willie E. 
Williams, was convicted of petty theft and received the maximum 
sentence of one-year incarceration in addition to a $500 fine and 
$5 in court costs.191 An Illinois statute provided that a defendant 
could be forced to remain confined in order to “work off” his 
monetary obligations at a rate of $5 per day at the conclusion of 
his sentence.192 Because Williams could not pay the monies owed, 
                                                                                                     
spending thirty days in jail is really no choice at all to the person who cannot 
raise $100. The resulting imprisonment is no more or no less than imprisonment 
for being poor . . . .”); Derek A. Westen, Comment, Fines, Imprisonment, and the 
Poor: “Thirty Dollars or Thirty Days,” 57 CAL. L. REV. 778, 806–07 (1969) 
(discussing imprisonment-for-debt provisions of laws). 
 186. See MO. REV. STAT. § 543.70 (1979) (allowing a judge to imprison 
someone for not paying their fines); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.826 (1985) 
(allowing incarceration if someone does not comply with the judge’s order—
including payment of fines); Cammett, supra note 60, at 403 (explaining that 
failure to pay private debt can result in incarceration); see also DOUGLAS N. 
EVANS, THE DEBT PENALTY: EXPOSING THE FINANCIAL BARRIERS TO OFFENDER 
REINTEGRATION, 2–10 (2014), http://justicefellowship.org/sites/defaultfiles/The 
%20Debt%20Penalty_John%20Jay_August%202014.pdf (describing state 
statutes allowing incarceration for debt and the court’s dependency on these 
fees). 
 187. See ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 38, at 8–9 (remarking on courts’ 
increased reliance on LFOs for funding, specifically in Michigan, New Orleans, 
and Ohio). 
 188. See id. (noting the increased use of incarceration as a punishment for 
those unable to pay their debts).  
 189. See infra notes 190–196 (summarizing relevant case law). 
 190. 399 U.S. 235 (1970). 
 191. Id. at 236. 
 192. See id. at 236 n.3 (describing the criminal code section authorizing 
payment of fines through imprisonment at a rate of $5 a day). 
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the state determined that he would be confined for 101 days 
beyond the maximum period of confinement for the offense.193 
The Court held that imprisoning an individual for involuntary 
nonpayment of a fine or court cost violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when the aggregate 
imprisonment exceeds the statutory maximum imprisonment 
term for the crime.194 Therefore, “once the state has defined the 
outer limits of incarceration necessary to satisfy its penological 
interests and policies, it may not then subject a certain class of 
convicted defendants to a period of incarceration beyond the 
statutory maximum solely by reason of their indigency.”195  
One year later, Tate v. Short196 involved Preston A. Tate of 
Houston, Texas, who was committed to a municipal prison farm 
for eighty-five days to satisfy his accumulated fines of $425 
resulting from traffic offenses.197 The Court extended its 
reasoning in Williams to defendants not facing jail time for the 
original offense but who are unable to pay fines, ruling that the 
Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from automatically 
converting a fine into a jail term when the defendant is indigent 
and cannot pay the fine in full.198  
The third in the trio is Bearden v. Georgia,199 involving 
Danny Bearden, an illiterate man with a ninth grade education 
who pled guilty to felony burglary and theft and was placed on 
three years probation.200 As a condition of probation, he was 
ordered to pay a $500 fine and $250 in restitution.201 Although 
Bearden borrowed money from his parents in order to pay the 
first two installments of his debt, totaling $200, he was laid off 
from his job a month later and was unable to pay the remaining 
                                                                                                     
 193. See id. at 236–37 (“[H]e could not pay the fine and costs of $505.”). 
 194. Id. at 240–41. 
 195. Id. at 241–42. 
 196. 401 U.S. 395 (1971). 
 197. Id. at 396–97. 
 198. See id. at 397–98 (“[P]etitioner’s imprisonment for nonpayment 
constitutes precisely the same unconstitutional discrimination since, like 
Williams, petitioner was subjected to imprisonment solely because of his 
indigency.”).  
 199. 461 U.S. 660 (1983). 
 200. Id. at 662. 
 201. Id.  
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balance.202 Six months later, the state filed a petition to revoke 
his probation because he still had not paid.203 After an 
evidentiary hearing, the court revoked the probation, entered a 
conviction, and sentenced him to serve the remaining portion of 
the probationary period in prison:204  
[T]he [sentencing] court curtly rejected counsel’s suggestion 
that the time for making the payments be extended, saying 
that “the fallacy in that argument” is that the petitioner has 
long known he had to pay the $550 and yet did not comply 
with the court’s prior order to pay. The sentencing judge 
declared that “I don’t know any way to enforce the prior orders 
of the Court but one way,” which was to sentence him to 
imprisonment.205 
The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected Bearden’s claim that 
imprisonment for failure to pay a fine violated the Equal 
Protection Clause, and the Georgia Supreme Court denied 
review.206  
Consistent with Williams and Tate, but relying instead on 
the concept of fundamental fairness required under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,207 the Court 
characterized the sentencing court’s treatment of Bearden as 
unconstitutionally depriving him of his freedom: 
The focus of the [sentencing] court’s concern, then, was that 
the petitioner had disobeyed a prior court order to pay the fine, 
and for that reason must be imprisoned. But this is no more 
than imprisoning a person solely because he lacks funds to pay 
the fine, a practice we condemned in Williams and Tate. By 
sentencing petitioner to imprisonment simply because he could 
not pay the fine, without considering the reasons for the 
inability to pay or the propriety of reducing the fine or 
                                                                                                     
 202. See id. at 662–63 (“Petitioner, who has only a ninth-grade education 
and cannot read, tried repeatedly to find other work but was unable to do so.”). 
 203. See id. at 663 n.3 (explaining that the trial court found that the 
petitioner violated his parole for failure to report as directed and failure to pay 
fine and restitution). 
 204. Id.  
 205. Id. at 674 (internal citations omitted). 
 206. See id. at 663 n.5 (citing the earlier Georgia Supreme Court cases 
supporting decisions to reject claims and deny review). 
 207. See id. at 666 n.8 (explaining the advantages of a due process approach 
when considering a defendant’s financial background or status in sentencing). 
THE NEW PEONAGE 1633 
extending the time for payments or making alternative orders, 
the court automatically turned a fine into a prison sentence.208 
The Court determined that a sentencing court cannot revoke 
probation for failure to pay a fine and make restitution absent 
evidence and findings that the probationer was somehow 
responsible for the failure, and that alternative forms of 
punishment would be inadequate to meet the state’s interest in 
punishment and deterrence.209 It held that sentencing courts 
must determine two things before imprisoning a defendant for 
failure to pay court fees and restitution: ability to pay and 
alternatives to imprisonment.210 If the defendant willfully refused 
to pay or make efforts to obtain the resources to pay, he may be 
imprisoned for this failure.211 However, even if the defendant is 
indigent and cannot pay, he may still be imprisoned if there is no 
alternative to imprisonment that would adequately satisfy the 
state’s interests.212  
Aside from Fourteenth Amendment cases in which the fact 
patterns and questions presented have directly mirrored those of 
Williams, Tate, or Bearden,213 subsequent case law has addressed 
                                                                                                     
 208. Id. at 674. 
 209. See id. at 672 (“Only if the sentencing court determines that 
alternatives to imprisonment are not adequate in a particular situation to meet 
the State’s interest in punishment and deterrence may the State imprison a 
probationer who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay.”). 
 210. Id.  
 211. See id. (“If the probationer willfully refused to pay or failed to make 
sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the court may 
revoke probation and sentence the defendant to imprisonment . . . .”).  
 212. See id. (“Only if alternative measures are not adequate to meet the 
State’s interests . . . may the court imprison a probationer who has made 
sufficient bona fide efforts to pay.”).  
 213. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 986 F.2d 283, 284 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(vacating the judgment revoking probation for non-willful inability to pay under 
Bearden and remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with the 
Eighth Circuit’s opinion); Cleveland v. City of Montgomery, No. 2:13CV732-
MHT, 2014 WL 6461900, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 17, 2014) (declaring that the 
constitutional principles set out in Bearden apply in municipal court 
proceedings); Johnson v. State, 707 S.E.2d 373, 374 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) 
(reversing the revocation of defendant’s parole for failure to pay court-ordered 
fines and fees because the trial court failed to either make a finding of the 
defendant’s willfulness in failure to pay or consider other punishment 
alternatives if the defendant was not at fault); Wills v. Commonwealth, 396 
S.W.3d 319, 326 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013) (finding that the trial court abused its 
discretion by revoking probation without considering alternatives to 
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other issues arising from questions regarding the legality of 
imprisonment for criminal-justice debt.214 For instance, there 
have been cases—typically in the context of probation revocations 
for failure to pay court costs—that have established that the 
defendant must have the opportunity to present evidence of 
indigence at a hearing, that the hearing must determine whether 
the failure to pay was willful, and that there must be written 
findings of fact regarding ability to pay.215 Courts have also 
consistently held that the defendant must be given a reasonable 
opportunity to discharge the fine, and that alternatives to 
imprisonment must be considered by the sentencing court when 
the failure to pay was not willful, including installment plans and 
reductions of fee amounts.216 There has been conflicting case law 
among the lower courts, however, as to whether the defendant or 
the state bears the burden of proving indigence and 
willfulness.217 There is also a conflict among the courts as to 
whether plea bargains in which the state agrees to—or a statute 
                                                                                                     
imprisonment when the defendant failed to pay the weekly restitution fee in full 
despite good faith efforts to make payments). 
 214. See infra notes 216–221 and accompanying text (summarizing case 
law). 
 215. See, e.g., Jordan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Ark. 1997) (requiring 
written findings of fact regarding ability to pay); Greene v. Dist. Ct. of Polk Cty., 
342 N.W.2d 818–21 (Iowa 1983) (requiring a hearing to determine responsibility 
for failure to pay prior to commitment and finding that jailing defendant 
without notice or an opportunity to explain why he had not satisfied the 
conditional order was a denial of due process); Hendrix v. Lark, 482 S.W.2d 427, 
431 (Mo. 1972) (remanding indigent defendant to city court for a hearing to 
determine her ability to pay the fines and costs, and if unable to pay 
immediately, ordering an opportunity for her to pay in reasonable installments 
based upon her ability to pay).  
 216. See, e.g., Gilbert v. State, 669 P.2d 699, 703 (Nev. 1983) (“[B]efore a 
defendant may be imprisoned for nonpayment of a fine, a hearing must be held 
to determine his financial condition, and an indigent defendant must be allowed 
reduction of fine or discharge of fine through installment payments.”); State v. 
Townsend, 536 A.2d 782, 786 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (finding that 
defendant’s willful failure to pay restitution obviated the need for sentencing 
court to consider alternatives).  
 217. Compare State v. Bower, 823 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) 
(requiring the defendant to “show cause” why he should not be punished for 
failure to pay fines), with Del Valle v. State, 80 So. 3d 999, 1013 (Fla. 2011) 
(holding that the state must provide sufficient evidence of ability to pay and 
willful refusal to pay, after which the burden shifts to the probationer to prove 
inability to pay to rebut the state’s evidence). 
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mandates—automatic dismissal of the charges upon the payment 
of court costs should be subject to constitutional protection.218 
In the years since Bearden, courts frequently have either 
ignored these constitutional protections or developed strategies to 
skirt their edges. For instance, researchers have found that 
courts in many states are “either unwilling or unable to waive 
fees based on indigence, to tailor payment obligations to a 
person’s ability to pay, or to offer meaningful alternatives to 
payment such as community service.”219 At least fourteen states 
impose a “poverty penalty,” meaning that litigants are assessed 
additional costs and penalties for being unable to pay off LFOs 
immediately.220 Similarly, many states have at least one 
mandatory sentencing fee that cannot be waived regardless of the 
defendant’s ability to pay, and payment plans are often based not 
on an individual’s actual ability to pay, but on the state’s 
standard collection policies.221 
Another strategy, utilized by several states, including 
California and Missouri, is “fines or time” alternative sentencing 
that allows defendants to “volunteer” to be jailed in lieu of 
payment.222 Under this scenario, judges view nonpayment as an 
implicit request to automatically convert fines to jail time, 
without engaging in a colloquy with the defendant regarding 
                                                                                                     
 218. Compare Moody v. State, 716 So. 2d 562, 565 (Miss. 1998) (holding that 
a felony statute for writing bad checks that requires an automatic payment of 
$500 plus restitution in exchange for dismissal violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it is “discriminating to the poor, in 
that only the poor will face jail time”), with People v. Memminger, 469 N.Y.S.2d 
323, 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (finding that defendants’ inability to accept plea 
offer because of indigency did not violate their equal protection or due process 
rights). “All of these rules apply to the unequal treatment of indigent defendants 
after conviction and sentencing. They restrict the state’s power to increase the 
stringency of sentences already imposed on convicted indigent defendants. They 
do not restrict the District Attorney’s authority.” Id.  
 219. BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 13. But see State v. Blazina, 344 P.3d 
680, 685 (Wash. 2015) (holding that a sentencing judge must make “an 
individualized inquiry into the defendant’s current and future ability to pay 
before the court imposes LFOs”). 
 220. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 13 (criticizing the use of poverty 
penalties).  
 221. See id. at 13–14 (highlighting the inequality in payment plan 
minimums and schedules that ignore an individual’s ability to pay). 
 222. See id. at 23 (describing debt repayment or forgiveness through 
incarceration in Missouri, California, and North Carolina). 
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ability to pay.223 A variant of the “poverty penalty” is to place 
those who are unable to immediately pay off their LFOs on 
supervised probation with a thirty or sixty-day suspended 
sentence, regardless of ability to pay; when they are found to 
have willfully violated probation by not keeping up with 
payments, they are automatically sentenced to part or even the 
full length of the suspended sentence.224 Although the Supreme 
Court barred this practice in Tate v. Short,225 which federal 
appellate courts have followed,226 it continues to persist in state 
and municipal courtrooms across the United States. 227 
In addition to challenging the new peonage premised upon 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses, litigants have a potential avenue for redress in the 
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.228 The existing 
doctrine on excessive fines, however, specifies that the term 
“fines” is restricted to payments made to a sovereign as 
punishment for wrongdoing,229 and that the interpretation of 
“excessive” is limited to gross disproportionality to the offense, 
with no examination of the personal impact of a fine on the 
defendant.230 Yet, Beth Colgan argues that the historical record 
supports a broader interpretation than the Supreme Court allows 
with its conclusion that economic sanctions for people who are 
                                                                                                     
 223. See id. (noting a Missouri public defender’s successful challenge to a 
judge’s practice of converting unpaid LFOs into jail time). 
 224. See ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 38, at 22–23 (describing the 
process of “fine or time” sentences in municipal courts). 
 225. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 399 (1971) (prohibiting the state from 
converting a fine into a prison term for an indigent defendant without means to 
pay). 
 226. See, e.g., Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F.2d 726, 729 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding 
that courts may not impose a sentence that requires a defendant to choose 
between paying a fine “forthwith” or incarceration). 
 227. See ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 38 at 23–24 (reporting on the 
frequency of “fine or time” sentences in Orleans Parish municipal court).  
 228. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 229. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 
n.6 (1989) (finding supportive similarity among definitions of “fine” in 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth century legal dictionaries). 
 230. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998) (explaining 
the rationale of a gross proportionality standard between the gravity of the 
offense and the forfeiture).  
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unable to pay their debts is outside the scope of the Clause 
regardless of how excessive the debts may be.231 Colgan provides 
a detailed analysis of colonial and early American statutory and 
court records regarding fines to argue that the Court’s limitations 
on the use of historical evidence should be challenged.232 She then 
proposes a reinterpretation of the Clause that considers a “fine” 
as a deprivation of anything of economic value in response to a 
public offense, regardless of the recipient; and that “excessive” 
requires individualized consideration of offense and offender 
characteristics as well as the effect of the fine on the specific 
defendant or litigant.233 Colgan’s proposed interpretation could 
gain favor among judges and legislators if they agree that it is 
“more faithful to the historical record, while allowing for 
consideration of contemporary practices and understandings,”234 
thus providing greater individual protection to the millions of 
American adults and children who struggle with LFOs. 
Lastly, and not surprisingly given this Article’s grounding in 
the post-Civil War concept of peonage, there is potential for the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on involuntary servitude to be 
explicitly applied to situations arising out of criminal justice 
                                                                                                     
 231. See Colgan, supra note 60, at 283 (suggesting that if history is 
constitutionally relevant to interpretation, the Supreme Court has relied on an 
incomplete and skewed historical record); see also LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN, 
CHARGING INMATES PERPETUATES MASS INCARCERATION 6 (2015) (“Litigation 
centered on the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause offers a unique 
opportunity to argue that charging inmates fees while incarcerated is 
unconstitutional.”); Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the 
Original Meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 
893-94 (2013) (arguing that a narrow conceptualization of the excessive fines 
clause under the Eighth Amendment is not compelled by Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, and that the “Anglo-American legal tradition” calls for 
consideration not only of the proportionality between offense and penalty 
amount but also the defendant’s ability to pay).  
 232. See Colgan, supra note 60, at 295–336 (providing historical evidence to 
refute the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “excessive” and “fines”). 
 233. See id. at 343 (“[Historical evidence detailed in this article weighs 
heavily in favor of the notion that a ‘fine’—regardless of recipient—is a 
deprivation of anything of economic value in response to a public offense.”); id. 
at 347 (suggesting that historical evidence supports a broad scope of factors in 
determining proportionality and an explicit bar against fines that would 
impoverish the defendant). 
 234. Id. at 337. 
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debt.235 The Thirteenth Amendment is a “grand yet simple 
declaration of the personal freedom of all the human race within 
the jurisdiction of this government.”236 As Akhil Amar and Daniel 
Widawsky argue in the context of contemporary cases of child 
abuse, the Amendment is “more than a mere nineteenth-century 
relic, written only to reform a ‘peculiar’ time and place,”237 but 
instead “was designed to challenge longstanding institutions and 
practices that violated its core values of personhood and 
dignity.”238  
Admittedly, the text of the Thirteenth Amendment creates 
an exception for the punishment for crimes “whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted.”239 Yet, many people with LFOs 
find themselves entrapped in the criminal justice system because 
they lack the tools—such as a lawyer, transportation, or 
employment—necessary to successfully navigate it.240 When 
these individuals are convicted of a crime or adjudicated 
delinquent of a juvenile offense, it could be argued that they have 
not, in fact, been “duly convicted,” as “duly” is defined as 
“correctly, fairly, legitimately, as required, or rightfully.”241 They 
have also not been “duly” sentenced when such punishment 
includes financial obligations that these individuals have no 
viable means to meet. Instead, they have been convicted and 
sentenced in violation of the “more universal, transcendent norm” 
announced by the Thirteenth Amendment: that slavery in all its 
forms shall not exist.242  
                                                                                                     
 235. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary 
servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction.”); cf. Gross, supra note 60, at 181–84 (arguing that the bankruptcy 
laws implicate the Thirteenth Amendment through the peonage laws). 
 236. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1873). 
 237. Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A 
Thirteenth Amendment Response to Deshaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1359 
(1992). 
 238. Id. at 1374. 
 239. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 240. See supra notes 171–175 and accompanying text (describing the current 
criminal justice system’s use of LFOs and the system’s disparate impact upon 
the poor). 
 241. See WILLIAM C. BURTON, BURTON’S LEGAL THESAURUS 202 (Brian Burton, 
ed., 4th ed. 2007) (listing synonyms for “duly”). 
 242. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 237, at 1359 (contending that the 
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An obvious objection to the invocation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment in this context is that it is too great a conceptual 
leap to compare the condition of involuntary servitude that the 
Amendment condemns with the situation confronted by criminal-
justice debtors of today. Yet, as Vern Countryman, Karen Gross 
and others have argued in the context of bankruptcy,243 unless 
one is a strict constructionist, the fact that the framers had no 
conception of modern-day criminal-justice debt “does not 
eliminate conceptual parallels.”244 Nor does it rule out 
contemporary situations in which the Thirteenth Amendment, 
Anti-Peonage Act, or analogous state laws can be implicated, 
such as the circumstances faced by David Ramirez.245 In fact, as 
Gross has pointed out,246 there has been a growing movement to 
                                                                                                     
Thirteenth Amendment should be interpreted broadly). 
 243. See Countryman, supra note 60, at 826–27 (arguing that involuntary 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy for individual debtors that includes a payment plan 
taken from future earnings violates the Thirteenth Amendment); Gross, supra 
note 60, at 177 (calling attention to the potential for situations under federal 
bankruptcy laws to implicate or violate the Thirteenth Amendment); Margaret 
Howard, Bankruptcy Bondage, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 191, 192–93 (arguing that 
involuntary repayment plans in the Bankruptcy Code’s 2005 amendments 
implicate the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude); 
Robert J. Keach, Dead Man Filing Redux: Is the New Individual Chapter Eleven 
Unconstitutional?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 483, 502 (2005) (arguing that the 
Bankruptcy Code’s 2005 amendments “by paralleling chapter 13 but not 
prohibiting involuntary cases or forced conversions, and by not providing the 
option of escape through dismissal or conversion . . . raise genuine Thirteenth 
Amendment concerns”). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Issues 
Posed in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 
79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 571, 579 (2005) (arguing that, although not a frivolous 
argument, a challenge to chapter 11 based on peonage is likely ultimately to fail 
because “there is no possibility of contempt or imprisonment for those who fail 
to make the required payments . . . [resulting] only in denial of the discharge 
and dismissal of the case”). See also S. Elizabeth Gibson, Constitutional Issues 
Raised by BAPCPA, NAT’L BANKR. CONF. 12–15 (June 1, 2007), 
http://www.national bankruptcyconference.org/pubs.cfm. 
 244. Gross, supra note 60, at 177. 
 245. See supra notes 20–32 and accompanying text (describing the 
experience of David Ramirez). 
 246. Gross, supra note 60, at 177 n.80 (“There has been a growing movement 
to apply the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment and [A]nti-[P]eonage laws to a variety of 
situations (e.g., abortion and surrogate motherhood) that could not have been 
within the contemplation of the framers.” (citing application of the Thirteenth 
Amendment to abortion, surrogacy, institutionalized labor of the mentally 
handicapped, religious totalism, education, and migrant labor)).  
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apply the Thirteenth Amendment and anti-peonage laws to a 
variety of situations that could not have been within the 
contemplation of the framers.247 The Supreme Court itself has 
addressed the applicability of the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban 
on involuntary servitude to white, mentally-impaired farm 
laborers, whose circumstances admittedly differ from those 
existing in 1865, but who arguably share similarities with those 
entrapped by the two-tiered system of justice that exists in 
today’s U.S. courtrooms.248 Thus, if nineteenth century peonage is 
characterized by statutes that require, at a minimum, an 
individual to work against her will as the result of indebtedness, 
and if the coercion is made manifest by a threat of physical harm 
or imprisonment, there are undeniable similarities between the 
old and new forms of peonage.249 In sum, constitutional 
protections against the imprisonment of those too poor to pay 
their debts are not limited to interpretations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment250 but may also be found in the Eighth as well as the 
Thirteenth Amendments. 
                                                                                                     
 247. See, e.g., Amar and Widawsky, supra note 237, at 1359–60 (arguing 
that child abuse implicates the core concerns of the Thirteenth Amendment, and 
that the Amendment “provides the best constitutional vehicle to conceptualize 
and characterize” such cases); Paul R. Friedman, The Mentally Handicapped 
Citizen and Institutional Labor, 87 HARV. L. REV. 567, 579–82 (1974) (arguing 
that under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Thirteenth Amendment, 
mentally handicapped residents of public and private institutions who perform 
work for those institutions must be compensated); Robert L. Misner & John H. 
Clough, Arrestees as Informants—A Thirteenth Amendment Analysis, 29 STAN. 
L. REV. 713 731–34 (1977) (arguing that using arrestees as informants violates 
the Thirteenth Amendment, as the relationship and imbalance of power 
amounts to involuntary servitude); Lorraine Stone, Neoslavery—“Surrogate” 
Motherhood Contracts v. The Thirteenth Amendment, 6 L. & INEQUALITY 63, 73 
(1988) (declaring that surrogate motherhood contracts represent “baby-selling”, 
a form of “person-selling” that violates the Thirteenth Amendment).  
 248. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944 (1988) (“The 
guarantee of freedom from involuntary servitude has never been interpreted 
specifically to prohibit compulsion of labor by other means, such as psychological 
coercion. We draw no conclusions from this historical survey about the potential 
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment.”). 
 249. See infra Part III.E (describing parallels between peonage and 
criminal-justice debt).  
 250. See supra notes 184–207 and accompanying text (outlining case law 
using the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the indigent from imprisonment). 
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B. The Cost of Juvenile Court Involvement 
On November 24, 2004, a century after Marcus published his 
chronicle of life in a Georgia “peon camp,”251 a thirteen-year-old 
named Taylor M. and several other boys in Ventura County, 
California, threw rocks at construction equipment owned by J&S 
Excavating (J&S).252 After one of the boys threw a firecracker 
into a bulldozer, Taylor shut its door, and the bulldozer ignited.253 
Damages were estimated at over $170,000, including repair costs, 
rental expenses, and lost labor,254 although the estimate failed to 
account for the amount that J&S ultimately recovered from its 
insurance company.255 The state charged Taylor with arson and 
felony vandalism in juvenile delinquency court, following which 
he admitted the allegations, and the judge declared a maximum 
confinement period of three years, eight months.256 At this time, 
Taylor was struggling both academically and behaviorally in the 
sixth grade, having failed several courses and been repeatedly 
disciplined for misbehavior.257 In addition, he was diagnosed with 
a learning disability and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder, and his peers ridiculed him for attending special 
education classes.258  
On April 25, 2006, upon the prosecutor’s recommendation, 
the court placed Taylor in a deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) 
program with multiple conditions, including monthly restitution 
payments of $100.259 Soon thereafter, Taylor’s parents, who 
                                                                                                     
 251. See supra notes 3–20 and accompanying text (recounting aspects of 
Marcus’s experiences in a peon camp). 
 252. In re Taylor M., Juv. No. B215562, 2010 WL 557271, at *1 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Feb. 18, 2010).  
 253. Id. 
 254. See id. (“J&S suffered $171,235.55 in damages, including repair costs, 
rental expenses, and lost labor.”). 
 255. Email from David Andreasen, Appellate Attorney for Taylor M., to 
author (July 24, 2015, 19:41 EST) (recalling that the company did not ultimately 
bear the claimed losses) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 256. See Taylor M., 2010 WL 557271, at *1 (charging defendant with arson 
and vandalism in excess of $400, in violation of CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 451(d), 
594(b)(1)). 
 257. Brief for Appellant at 12–13, In re Taylor M., Juv. No. B215562, 2010 
WL 557271 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2010). 
 258. Id.  
 259. See In re Taylor M., Juv. No. B215562, 2010 WL 557271, at *1 (Feb. 18, 
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struggled to pay their bills, experienced a series of setbacks; his 
mother battled cancer and suffered two strokes and his father 
was disabled.260 His parents separated, and his father became 
homeless, as did his older brother.261 Because of his mother’s 
declining health, Taylor had to assist her with basic tasks of 
cooking and cleaning, while at the same time he made numerous 
attempts to find work to pay his restitution.262 Despite these 
hurdles, Taylor’s grades improved as did his school attendance 
and behavior, and he managed to complete all eighty hours of 
court-ordered community service as well as a counseling 
program.263 Ultimately, however, Taylor’s family was able to pay 
only $175 toward restitution between 2006 and 2009, at which 
time Ventura County Probation Officer Monica Gomez 
recommended revocation of his DEJ placement because “no effort 
[was] being made . . . at all.”264 The court agreed and revoked 
Taylor’s DEJ placement, putting him on formal probation that 
left him vulnerable to the three years, eight months, term of 
incarceration.265 In 2010, the Court of Appeal of California 
affirmed the judge’s decision, stating the following: 
In January 2008, after hearing appellant’s explanation for his 
failure to comply with the conditions of his DEJ placement, the 
court provided him another opportunity to do so. It warned 
him, however, that he must make more than the “terrible 
effort” that he had made in the prior 18 months. Appellant 
again failed to make payments on a regular basis, despite 
                                                                                                     
2010) (“The court placed him in the DEJ program on April 25, 2006 pursuant to 
section 790, under multiple conditions, including his making monthly 
restitution payments of $100 toward a total restitution of $171,235.55, with a 
right to credit for amounts paid by other parties.”); see also CAL. WELF. & INST. 
CODE § 791(b) (West 2015) (“[T]he court may summarily grant deferred entry of 
judgment if the minor admits the charges in the petition and waives time for the 
pronouncement of judgment.”). 
 260. Brief for Appellant at 13, Taylor M., 2010 WL 557271, at *8–9.  
 261. See id. (describing the significant decline in defendant’s family 
circumstances).  
 262. See id. at 13–14 (“Appellant testified he applied for jobs at Pep Boys, 
Islands Hamburger, Chili’s, Home Depot, Target, Newbury Park Bicycle Shop, 
and many auto mechanics.”).  
 263. Id. 
 264. Taylor M., 2010 WL 557271, at *5. 
 265. In re Taylor M., Juv. No. B215562, 2010 WL 557271, at *1 (Feb. 18, 
2010). 
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having been told that [his DEJ placement would not be 
revoked] if he could only make a small payment. The court 
neither violated the constitution nor acted unfairly and 
arbitrarily when it later revoked appellant’s DEJ placement 
and placed him on probation. 266 
Appellant argues that the court abused its discretion in 
denying his request to reduce the amount of his monthly 
restitution payment. We disagree. Moreover, the denial of that 
request did not prejudice appellant. The probation department 
would not have recommended the revocation of his DEJ 
placement if he had met with his probation officer on a regular 
basis and made small payments ($10, $5, or $1). Appellant 
failed to establish that he tried to do those things.267 
The chain of events experienced by Taylor and his family is 
typical of that encountered by many children in juvenile 
delinquency court, whether the amount owed results from 
restitution, fines, user fees, or a combination of the three 
categories. For instance, in approximately twenty states, 
legislatures have laws requiring the parent or legal guardian to 
pay the costs of juvenile court fines and fees.268 In some states, 
parents have the right to negotiate these fees, but it is not an 
easy process, and if they fail to pay, wages can be garnished, liens 
can be placed on homes, and tax refunds can be automatically 
applied to the court debt.269 When a juvenile court judge orders a 
child to be placed outside the home as part of the disposition, 
twenty-two states have statutes that make it discretionary and 
twenty-nine make it mandatory to require that the parent pay at 
least part of these costs.270 It may convincingly be argued that 
                                                                                                     
 266. Id.  
 267. Id. at *4.  
 268. See Myles Bess, Double Charged: The True Co$t of Juvenile Justice, 
YOUTH RADIO (May 8, 2014), https://youthradio.org/news/article/double-charged-
fines-and-fees/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (quoting Lauren-Brooke Eisen, legal 
scholar at New York University’s Brennan Center for Justice) (on file with 
Washington and Lee Law Review). But see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2506 (4) 
(capping restitution for delinquent juveniles at $500, calling for joint and 
several liability for all participants, and enabling the court to waive restitution 
“if the juvenile satisfies the court that the juvenile does not have, and could not 
reasonably acquire, the means to make restitution”).  
 269. See id. (describing the potential consequences faced by parents in 
California whose children fail to pay court fines and fees).  
 270. See Linda A. Syzmanski, Can Parents Ever be Obligated for the Support 
of Their Institutionalized Delinquent Children?, 16 NAT’L CENT. JUV. JUST. 
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particularly in the context of juvenile court, the assessment of 
restitution is analytically distinct from the assessment of fines or 
fees, because the concept of making the victim whole via the 
payment of restitution is central to progressive notions of 
restorative justice and to the juvenile court’s unique therapeutic 
purpose. Yet, the consequences of failure to pay restitution for a 
low-income family can be extreme and excessively punitive. For 
instance, in thirty-six jurisdictions, statutes explicitly provide for 
parent liability for restitution if the child is unable to pay or 
unable to complete an alternative option, such as community 
service.271 In at least ten jurisdictions, if the child fails to pay 
restitution fees or fine, it can result in a youth’s probation being 
extended to age twenty-one.272 Although the court must first 
evaluate a family’s financial ability to pay LFOs, which usually 
occurs at a hearing, judges have wide discretion in making such 
determinations, and there is little oversight and very limited 
opportunity to challenge the costs imposed.273 
In Alameda County, California, for example, the total 
amount of juvenile court fines and fees imposed on children and 
their families adds up quickly. Upon arrest, the cost of detention 
in juvenile hall is $25 per day; if the youth is released from 
detention, the cost of a GPS ankle monitor is $15 per day or $105 
                                                                                                     
SNAPSHOT 4 (Apr. 2011) (allowing that even when payment is mandatory, 
payment is based on a hearing’s determination of the parent’s ability to pay). 
 271. See Juvenile Restitution Statutes, NAT’L JUV. DEFENDER CENT. (Mar. 
2015) http://njdc.info/juvenile-restitution-statutes (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) 
(summarizing a national review of state restitution laws compiled by the 
National Juvenile Defender Center and the University of Michigan Juvenile 
Justice Clinic) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 272. See POLICY ADVOCACY CLINIC OF EAST BAY COMMUNITY LAW CENTER, 
FINANCIAL COSTS FOR YOUTH AND THEIR FAMILIES IN THE ALAMEDA COUNTY 
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: A GUIDE FOR ADVOCATES 3 (2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2448484 (describing 
probation extension procedures in Alameda County, California); Jurisdictional 
Boundaries, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION (Dec. 16, 2014), 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/qa04106.asp?qaDate=2013&text 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (displaying the extended age of juvenile court 
jurisdiction for all states in 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 273. See Juvenile Restitution Statutes, supra note 265 (commenting on the 
availability of alternative options to restitution subject to judicial discretion); 
POLICY ADVOCACY CLINIC, supra note 272, at 6–7 (outlining the procedure for 
juvenile fee reduction, waiver, and rehearing in Alameda County, California). 
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per week.274 For the process of determining whether a formal 
complaint will issue, there is an investigation fee of $250.275 If 
there is an adjudicatory hearing, appointed counsel costs $300.276 
If the youth is found not delinquent, the charge may be 
dismissed, but the family must still pay investigation and legal 
fees.277 If the youth is found delinquent, the judge will impose a 
sentence and assign additional costs, such as a restitution order 
paid to the victim and restitution fines paid to the California 
State Restitution Fund ($25 dollars for a misdemeanor; $100 for a 
felony).278 If the youth is placed on probation, informal 
supervision is $90 per month for an average of fourteen 
months.279 Formal probation is also $90 per month but can 
include the following: regular drug testing at $12 per test; GPS 
monitoring at $15 per day for an average of forty-five days; and 
juvenile hall for $25 per day for an average of twenty-three days 
for probation violations.280 The family can request a financial 
rehearing before a judge if the court’s financial hearing officer 
denies a fee deduction or waiver request, but restitution orders 
and fines can only be waived or reduced under very limited 
circumstances.281 If probation is successfully completed and the 
youth is eighteen or older, the court may seal the juvenile court 
record, but it will cost an additional $150.282 In total, for children 
who are detained for the average period, the bill could approach 
or even exceed $2000.283 In short, as in the earlier world of 
                                                                                                     
 274. Teresa Chin, The Co$t of Juvenile Court Involvement, YOUTH RADIO 
(May 8, 2014), https://youthradio.org/news/article/double-charged/ (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. See id. (reporting the cost assessed in Alameda County courts even 
when the case is ultimately dismissed). 
 278. POLICY ADVOCACY CLINIC, supra note 272, at 4. 
 279. Chin, supra note 274. 
 280. Id. 
 281. See id. (“After you complete probation and are at least 18, you may 
apply to have your juvenile record sealed. $150."); POLICY ADVOCACY CLINIC, 
supra note 266, at 6–7 (“Unfortunately, restitution amounts cannot be reduced 
or eliminated based on the family’s inability to pay, unless the restitution has 
been ordered for graffiti . . . .”).  
 282. Chin, supra note 274. 
 283. Bess, supra note 268. 
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peonage, the descent into the criminal justice system can impose 
hidden but inexorable costs that may make extrication from the 
system difficult if not impossible for lower income children and 
families—even if a child is not ultimately adjudicated delinquent.  
The municipal court systems of our states are another forum 
that leaves children—typically older teenagers—struggling to pay 
LFOs. Municipal courts are those that can promulgate local laws 
relating to the community’s health and safety, such as traffic and 
quality of life infractions, as long as they do not run contrary to 
state law.284 Mayors approve the laws, local police enforce them 
via citation or arrest, and local judges adjudicate them in 
municipal courtrooms.285 A number of states preclude juvenile 
court treatment for those who are older than fifteen or sixteen 
and are alleged to have violated a state or municipal traffic 
ordinance or regulation; instead, these matters are handled 
exclusively by municipal courts.286 Because these are considered 
civil proceedings, however, most defendants—including 
adolescents—are not represented by lawyers, and those who are 
indigent do not receive appointed counsel.287 As a result, 
municipal court defendants fail to appreciate the consequences of 
pleading guilty and are frequently left with significant user fees, 
which can lead to incarceration for failure to pay, to appear in 
court, or to comply with probation.288 Numerous states, including 
                                                                                                     
 284. See Quinn, supra note 155 (remarking on the range of matters local and 
municipal ordinances govern). 
 285. See id. (describing the predominant structure and politics of local 
governments). 
 286. See Juvenile Justice System Structure & Process, OFF. JUV. JUST. & 
DELINQ. PREVENTION (June 29, 2015), http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_ 
process/qa 04102.asp?qaDate=2014 (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (listing juvenile 
court age limits across the jurisdictions in the United States) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 287. See Quinn, supra note 155 (recounting the juvenile and municipal court 
procedure in Ferguson, Missouri, where court was once held for hundreds of 
unrepresented defendants at a local basketball court); see also Lewis R. Katz, 
Municipal Courts—Another Urban Ill, 20 CASE W. RE. L. REV. 87, 106–08 (1997) 
(noting that in a study of 1,034 defendants in municipal court, 770 were without 
an attorney and 264 were represented by an attorney, likely because the 
unrepresented defendants did not have the resources to hire a lawyer).  
 288. See Quinn, supra note 155 (reasoning that without “meaningful 
explanation of their options, advice about pleading guilty, or information 
about . . . consequences” defendants are unlikely to comprehend that an 
inability to pay fines can and will lead to arrest and jail time). 
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Missouri, Wyoming, Texas, and Colorado, have municipal courts 
that run what Elizabeth Angelone termed “shadow juvenile 
justice systems”289 that fail to provide specialized due process 
protections for these young litigants.290 
In addition to the hardships resulting from economic 
sanctions, the new peonage brings other, more intangible costs to 
children and their families that go beyond the fees and fines that 
are assessed against them.  
C. Collateral Consequences for the Family 
Kathie is a forty-nine-year-old white woman in Kitsap 
County, Washington, who has four children, three of whom she 
supports financially.291 Although she is divorced, she lives in an 
apartment with her ex-husband, his father, and three of their 
children.292 Kathie has eleven felony convictions for forgery, 
stolen property, and possession of stolen property, which she says 
resulted from a long-term drug addiction and living in poverty.293 
Her initial LFOs totaled $11,000, but with twelve percent 
interest, she now owes $20,000.294 Kathie is eighty percent deaf 
and has limited employment opportunities, but she secured a job 
at a prisoner re-entry program after participating as a client in 
the program.295 She earns $3,000 per month.296 
                                                                                                     
 289. Elizabeth Angelone, The Texas Two-Step: The Criminalization of 
Truancy Under the Texas “Failure to Attend” Statute, 13 ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON 
MINORITY ISSUES, 433, 452 (2010) (coining the phrase “shadow juvenile justice 
system”).  
 290. See Quinn, supra note 155 (“[M]issouri is not alone in . . . running 
municipal courts without specialized protections or concerns for youthful 
litigants. Several other states . . . fail[] to account for youthful vulnerabilities.”). 
 291. ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 38, at 70. 
 292. Id. 
 293. See id. (explaining how these convictions led to Kathie’s subsequent 
crippling debt).  
 294. Id. 
 295. See id. (explaining Kathie’s mixed feelings about her job; while she is 
grateful for the full time position, it is not enough to support her children 
financially or to break out of debt).  
 296. See id. (detailing how Kathie now works for the same re-entry program 
that she once took part in). 
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As a result of Kathie’s failure to keep up with her LFO 
payments, the court transferred her defaulted legal debt to a 
collection agency, which would not negotiate a manageable 
payment schedule with her.297 Because of the constant financial 
pressure, Kathie and her children have little choice but to 
maintain a chaotic living situation: six people—including three 
adults—renting a small three-bedroom apartment.298 Her 
criminal record and poor credit history have made it impossible to 
find alternate housing.299 Yet, the hardships for Kathie and her 
children go beyond merely living under monetary constraints, as 
she explained: 
It seems like one of those challenges that are insurmountable. 
It’s like a paraplegic trying to climb Mt. Everest. I mean it just 
seems that impossible. It’s like an insurmountable barrier, 
that seems like, I’m gonna die with this debt hanging over my 
head. And I’m never gonna be able to have my own little piece 
of property, my own little something. And it’s not even about 
buying a house. I can’t even rent a place.300 
For many low-income people like Kathie, criminal-justice 
debt and its resultant destabilization and stigma can pave a path 
back to reoffending and, often, to prison. It makes probation and 
parole violations more likely.301 A suspended driver’s license 
resulting from failure to pay one’s LFOs means loss of 
transportation and the potential loss of employment, and it can 
also lead to criminal sanctions if the person is caught driving.302 
Damaged credit means difficulty finding employment and 
                                                                                                     
 297. See id. (describing the credit company’s unrealistic approach to 
payment schedule negotiation).  
 298. See id. at 71 (explaining that among those six adults, Kathie is forced to 
uncomfortably reside with her ex-husband and father-in-law as a result of her 
not being able to afford alternative housing). 
 299. See id. (detailing how Kathie’s former criminal convictions sent her into 
immediate debt, from which she has not been able to recover).  
 300. Id. at 71–72. 
 301. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 20–22 (finding that all fifteen of 
the states examined make criminal justice debt a condition of probation, parole, 
or other correctional supervision, and when individuals fail to pay, they may 
face re-arrest and incarceration); Shapiro, supra note 174 (finding that in at 
least forty-four states, offenders can be billed for their own probation and parole 
supervision). 
 302. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 24–25 (finding that the suspension 
of driver’s licenses is a common practice that leads to a cycle of re-incarceration).  
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housing, which makes it harder to meet other financial 
obligations, resulting in a greater likelihood of recidivism.303 
Failure to provide one’s children with basic necessities can trigger 
the intervention of Child Protective Services, which can lead to 
neglect allegations and further court hearings and fees.304 For 
non-custodial parents like David Ramirez, failure to pay child 
support can lead to incarceration, during which the debt 
continues to accrue.305 Further compounding a family’s 
vulnerability, people who violate probation or parole are 
ineligible for federal benefits such as Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program benefits (food stamps), low-income housing assistance, 
and Supplemental Security Income (disability).306 
In recent decades, social scientists have increasingly studied 
the impact on children of parental involvement with the criminal 
justice system.307 Not surprisingly, there are strong correlations 
between such involvement and economic strain as well as family 
instability.308 Controlling for risk factors that were present prior 
to incarceration (i.e., parental substance abuse, mental illness, 
and lack of education), researchers have found that children 
whose parents have been incarcerated (or placed under house 
arrest) are eighty percent more likely to live in households with 
                                                                                                     
 303. See id. at 5 (explaining how the accumulation of debt during 
incarceration and after court costs leads to more debt).  
 304. See Bullock, supra note 41, at 1043–44 (detailing Child Protective 
Services’ tendency to confuse poverty for neglect); DiFonzo, supra note 41, at 
92–96 (describing the role and powers of the court in a child neglect case).  
 305. See NAGRECHA ET AL., supra note 32, at 15 (describing aspects of court 
ordered child support that make it a serious source of indebtedness for 
incarcerated men). 
 306. See Barbara Weiner, Alleged Probation Violations Lead to Automatic 
Termination of Benefits, EMPIRE JUST. CTR. (Nov. 2, 2009), 
http://www.empirejustice.org/issue-areas/disability-benefits/non-disability-issues/ 
fleeing-felons/alleged-probation-violations.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) 
(explaining how parole violations can lead to the termination of benefits) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF), MONT. DEPT. PUB. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
http://dphhs.mt.gov/hcsd/TANF.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (explaining 
eligibility for TANF) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 307. See, e.g., Susan D. Phillips et al., Disentangling the Risks: Parent 
Criminal Justice Involvement and Children’s Exposure to Family Risks, 5 CRIM. 
& PUB. POL’Y 677 (2006). 
 308. Id. at 685.  
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economic strain and 130 percent more likely to experience family 
instability than those without incarcerated parents.309 
Furthermore, incarceration and other outcomes of arrest were 
linked to increased likelihood of children developing serious 
emotional and behavioral problems as well as alcohol and 
substance abuse and, in turn, of becoming involved with the 
juvenile or criminal court systems themselves.310  
Moreover, material deprivation experienced by low-income 
parents, with or without criminal justice involvement, has also 
been demonstrated to have both short- and long-term detrimental 
effects on children.311 These include aggression, anxiety, and 
depression, as well as negative academic outcomes, poor health 
statuses, and diminished future earnings.312 In short, the 
intergenerational effects of criminal justice involvement and 
parental incarceration are exacerbated by LFOs that result from 
juvenile and criminal court fees, fines, and other costs.  
Yet, despite empirical evidence of family adversity resulting 
from the new peonage, one of the ironies is that the cost to the 
state of collecting court fees and of incarcerating those who have 
failed to pay typically results in a net deficit for government 
coffers, as discussed in the next section. 
                                                                                                     
 309. Id. at 688, 690. 
 310. See id. at 693 (linking “at-risk” youth to families where parents have 
been arrested or incarcerated). See generally PEGGY GIORDANO, LEGACIES OF 
CRIMES: A FOLLOW-UP OF THE CHILDREN OF HIGHLY DELINQUENT GIRLS AND BOYS 
(2010) (explaining the dynamics of intergenerational transmission of crime, 
violence, and drug use among the children of “highly delinquency” boys and girls 
using quantitative and qualitative data). 
 311. See, e.g., Afshin Zilanawala & Natasha V. Pilkauskas, Low-Income 
Mothers’ Material Hardship and Children’s Socio-emotional Wellbeing 22–24 
(Fragile Families, Working Paper 2011) (explaining the results of a study that 
found a strong link between children’s socio-emotional outcome and material 
hardship); see also Wesley T. Church et al., Neighborhood, Poverty, and 
Delinquency: An Examination of Differential Association and Social Control 
Theory, 34 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV. 1035, 1040 (2012) (finding a correlation 
between family stability, poverty, and availability of resources and negative 
behavior in children); Ofira Schwartz-Soicher et al., The Effect of Paternal 
Incarceration on Material Hardship, 85 SOC. SERV. REV. 447, 448 (2011) (finding 
that families suffer increased financial costs as a result of incarceration, 
including transportation for visits to the facility, collect phone calls from the 
inmate, and legal representation).  
 312. Zilanawala & Pilkauskas, supra note 311, at 3–4 (documenting the 
negative effects low-income houses often have on children).  
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D. Fiscal Impact on the State 
In 1986, the Conference of State Court Administrators 
(“COSCA”) adopted a set of standards related to the use of court 
fines and fees in response to states’ growing reliance upon courts 
to generate revenue to fund themselves as well as other functions 
of state government.313 In 2011–2012, COSCA revisited the topic 
with a restatement of the earlier standards, which it labeled as 
“principles.”314 In the more recent iteration, the authors—who 
themselves are retired state court administrators—acknowledged 
the continuing pressure on courts to generate revenue, yet they 
also condemned using court fines and fees to fund other state 
services; warned that such use is nothing less than a regressive 
tax imposed upon offenders and litigants; and called for fees to be 
waived for the indigent.315 The policy paper states: 
In criminal cases, court leaders have a responsibility not only 
to ensure that judicial orders are enforced—i.e., fees and fines 
are collected—but also to ensure that the system does not 
impose unreasonable financial obligations assessed to fund 
other governmental services. In traffic infractions, whether 
characterized as criminal or civil, court leaders face the 
greatest challenge in ensuring that fines, fees, and surcharges 
are not simply an alternate form of taxation.316  
COSCA invoked the Supreme Court’s 1971 decision in Boddie v. 
Connecticut317 to assert the basic precept that access to the courts 
is a fundamental right,318 and it cited with approval several state 
court decisions holding that filing fees in civil cases should be 
                                                                                                     
 313. See CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMIN’RS, STANDARDS RELATING TO 
COURT COSTS: FEES, MISCELLANEOUS CHARGES AND SURCHARGES AND A NATIONAL 
SURVEY OF PRACTICE 1–13 (1986) (detailing the process of determining new 
standards and laying out the new standards).  
 314. See Carl Reynolds & Jeff Hall, Courts Are Not Revenue Centers, CONF. 
ST. CT. ADMIN. (2012), http://cosca.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/COSCA/ 
Policy%20Papers/CourtsAreNotRevenueCenters-Final.ashx (last visited Nov. 
11, 2015) (using case law to define the relevant principles of court-generated 
revenue) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 315. See id. at 1, 8 (examining the affect court fees have on the indigent). 
 316. Id. at 1.  
 317. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
 318. See id. at 380–81 (explaining that due process prohibits denying divorce 
or other similar legal proceedings to those who cannot afford to pay the court 
fees and costs). 
1652 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1595 (2015) 
imposed only to fund programs directly involving judicial 
services.319 In regard to criminal cases, COSCA reiterated that 
these court costs should also bear a reasonable relationship to the 
expense of prosecution, although it acknowledged that 
determinations of whether court costs are valid in criminal cases 
rely on state-specific holdings, and that there is no general 
principle that defines their validity.320 
Several other recent policy reports and white papers have 
confirmed that states are increasingly turning to court user fees 
and surcharges both to underwrite criminal justice costs and also 
to close general budgetary gaps.321 Given the evidence, it could be 
argued that this practice potentially undermines separation of 
powers by mandating that courts act as fundraising entities for 
non-judicial programs or agencies created by the legislature or 
executives. Florida, for example, uses them to such an extent that 
observers have referred to the court system as “cash register 
justice.”322 The Sunshine State has added more than twenty new 
categories of LFOs since 1996 and eliminated most exemptions 
                                                                                                     
 319. See id. at 375–76 (asserting that the right to take a case to court is a 
function of due process because “the judicial proceeding [is] the only effective 
means of resolving the dispute . . . and denial of a defendant’s access to that 
process raises grave problems for its legitimacy.”); Reynolds & Hall, supra note 
308, at 2–3 (detailing the decisions of other jurisdictions where access to the 
court was held to be a fundamental right); see, e.g., Safety Net for Abused 
Persons v. Segura, 692 So. 2d 1038, 1044 (La. 1997) (holding that fees assessed 
must be for services that bear a “logical connection to the judicial system”); Fent 
v. State ex. rel. Dept. of Hum. Servs., 236 P.3d 61, 70 (Okla. 2010) (holding that 
portions of court costs cannot be deposited into accounts to fund non-judicial 
programs); LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 341 (Tex. 1986) (holding that 
“filing fees that go to state general revenues . . . are unreasonable impositions 
on the state constitutional right of access to the courts”). But see Crist v. Ervin, 
No. SC10-1317, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 1858, at *4 (Fla. Nov. 4, 2010) (upholding 
statutes directing portions of civil filing fees to a general revenue fund). 
 320. See Reynolds & Hall, supra note 308, at 5–7 (explaining how court costs 
sought from a defendant in a criminal proceeding vary widely from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction). 
 321. See, e.g., BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 30–31 (discussing that the 
overreliance on criminal justice fees undermines the proper roles of courts and 
correctional agencies); PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 47, at 6 (“In some cases, 
criminal fees are used to support general revenue funds or treasuries unrelated 
to the administration of criminal law.”). 
 322. Rebekah Diller, The Hidden Costs of Florida’s Criminal Justice Fees, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.brennan 
center.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Justice/FloridaF&F.pdf. 
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for those unable to pay.323 Although the state uses monies 
generated by court fees to subsidize its general revenue funds, 
the Florida legislature has failed to consider both the cumulative 
effect on its citizens who are required to pay and the data that 
criminal-justice debt can lead to recidivism.324 Furthermore, in 
many cases these debts are uncollectible, with even employee 
performance standards reflecting that only nine percent of fees 
levied in felony cases can expect to be collected.325  
Yet, states rarely examine the fiscal and personnel costs 
incurred by courts and municipalities to administer collection 
mechanisms that fail to exempt the indigent.326 Just as 
nineteenth century state legislatures entered into an unholy 
alliance with private employers or corporations by “leasing out” 
their incarcerated inmates to raise state funds and creating 
“crimes” like vagrancy to feed such a system, so too are early 
twenty-first century state legislatures turning the enforcement of 
minor criminal justice sanctions into a device to raise revenues, 
with poor and minority offenders paying the price. 
The failure to recognize that LFOs require an extensive 
infrastructure to turn court and correctional officials into 
collection agents is, in fact, one of the limitations of the COSCA 
paper,327 which is an analytic weakness shared by those who 
support the continued imposition of court fees and fines upon low-
income offenders. It is critical to acknowledge that such a regime 
requires the following to maintain its operations: court personnel 
to administer payment plans, driver’s license sanctions, electronic 
fund transfers, liens, and wage and bank account garnishment; 
specialized collection courts to adjudicate payment plans; law 
enforcement to issue and serve warrants for failure to pay or 
appear in court; and, not infrequently, court personnel to 
themselves act as tax collection agents.328 As a result, rather than 
                                                                                                     
 323. See id. at 1 (explaining that Florida is one of two states, the other being 
North Carolina, that does not exempt indigent defendants from court cost 
charges). 
 324. See id. at 7 (discussing the constitutional concerns of sending convicted 
criminals into debt on top of their convictions).  
 325. Id. 
 326. See id. at 9 (discussing inefficiencies of collection mechanisms). 
 327. Reynolds & Hall, supra note 314. 
 328. Diller, supra note 322, at 13–19 (emphasizing the expense of collecting 
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serve as a straightforward revenue source for the state, the 
income generated from this hidden regressive tax often does not 
exceed the operational costs necessary to facilitate collection.329 
In fact, a recent cost-benefit analysis of court fees in eleven states 
revealed that the cost of funding sheriffs, local jails and prisons, 
prosecutors and defense attorneys, and court personnel to 
administer these twenty-first century debtors’ prisons actually 
comes at a fiscal loss to the state.330 Other studies have confirmed 
these findings.331 This dynamic burdens the court system and 
interferes with the proper administration of justice, as it diverts 
the resources of courts away from their essential functions, and, 
“in its most extreme form, threaten[s] the impartiality of judges 
and other court personnel with institutional, pecuniary 
incentives.”332 Moreover, the new peonage has the “paradoxical 
result of engendering more incarceration because the poor are 
unable to pay, and the monetary costs of such punitive jailing is 
still ultimately borne by the state.”333 
The parallels between the new peonage and the nineteenth 
century version, which was discussed in Part II, are addressed in 
the next section. 
                                                                                                     
criminal justice debt). 
 329. See, e.g., ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 38, at 9 (explaining the 
inefficient nature of criminal-justice debt). 
 330. RACHEL L. MCLEAN & MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS 
JUSTICE CENTER 7 (2007) (“An examination of court-ordered obligations in eleven 
states found an average of $178 million per state in uncollected court costs, 
fines, fees and restitution . . . . [Additionally,] administrators in one state report 
that only twenty-three percent of fines are successfully collected, and no action 
is taken on uncollected payments.”).  
 331. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 322, at 18–19, which analyzed the utility of 
arresting persons for failure to appear in Leon County (Florida) Collections 
Court and found that the cost of incarceration was over $45,000 for the county 
and the cost to make 838 arrests plus the cost to execute this many warrants 
over the course of one year totaled over $62,000. In contrast, the monies 
generated from the payment of bonds or the original debt were at most $80,000, 
with the net loss to the county likely to be even greater, as the figures do not 
include costs of first appearance hearings in court for those who were arrested. 
Id; see also ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 38, at 23 (quoting a judge who 
said that the “fine or time” practices in the Orleans Parish municipal court may 
cost the city more than it collects, as the typical case involved debts of only $100, 
which were converted into costly thirty-day jail sentences). 
 332. BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 30. 
 333. Cammett, supra note 60, at 383 (emphasis added). 
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E. Parallels Between Old and New 
There are certain obvious parallels between the old and new 
forms of peonage, several of which have been at least implicitly 
illustrated in earlier sections of this Article.334 Both systems 
involve either indebtedness or minor crimes for which fines or 
collateral fees are imposed.335 Both are concerned with monetary 
payments owed by vulnerable individuals to the state or to more 
powerful private entities.336 Both involve coercive techniques 
used against the debtor.337 There are also less obvious parallels, 
as well as distinct differences, which will be examined here. 
Both the “old” and the “new” forms of peonage338 share 
structural similarities. Under the old form, law enforcement 
arrested emancipated blacks on trumped-up criminal charges, 
such as vagrancy, and permitted an employer to pay the 
convicted defendant’s fine in exchange for his labor.339 For some, 
like Marcus, the employer-mandated hard labor was the 
equivalent of incarceration;340 for others, the debt required 
workers to sacrifice basic life necessities in order to repay the 
advance to avoid incarceration.341 The landowners’ motivation 
was to meet the South’s need for cheap, reliable labor as well as 
to intimidate and remind emancipated blacks of their continued 
                                                                                                     
 334. See, e.g., supra notes 252–290 and accompanying text (suggesting 
parallels between peons and defendants who have LFOs). 
 335. See notes 252–290 and accompanying text (noting the similarity 
between criminal-justice debt and debt owed to former plantation owners by 
blacks after the Civil War).  
 336. See notes 252–290 and accompanying text (noting LFOs are paid to the 
State while peons paid debt to former plantation owners).  
 337. See notes 252–290 and accompanying text (suggesting the threat of 
incarceration for failure to pay LFOs is analogous to the cycle of debt peons 
endured). 
 338. For clarity, in this section, the terms “old form” and “new form” will 
serve as shorthand references to the post-Civil War form of peonage and the 
twenty-first century form of peonage, respectively. 
 339. See infra Part II (discussing the strategic use of arrests to facilitate 
cheap labor by emancipated slaves). 
 340. See supra notes 3–17 and accompanying text (noting that Marcus 
worked in shackles while under the supervision of armed guards). 
 341. See infra Part II (discussing the cycle of coerced labor in the old 
peonage). 
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lack of social and political status.342 Under the new form, low-
income people, many of whom are already living at the margins of 
society, frequently incur criminal-justice debt as a result of 
minor, nonviolent offenses that in many instances stem from the 
criminalization of poverty.343 Whatever the motivation of the 
state within this new paradigm, the scenario is reminiscent—at 
least in spirit—of the “welfare reform” initiatives of the 1990s in 
which the government mandated that the poor work, or at least 
demonstrate their willingness to work, in order to receive 
government assistance.344 When people inevitably failed to 
comply with the bureaucratic requirements of the welfare reform 
regime, the government removed them from public benefits rolls, 
and those with criminal records (or merely with pending criminal 
charges) automatically lost their subsidized housing, public 
benefits, and food stamps, with no recourse or opportunity to 
appeal.345 This allowed for the federal and state governments to 
redirect these funds to other government programs and 
agencies.346 As with the “welfare-to-work” programs of the 1980s 
                                                                                                     
 342. See supra notes 3–17 and accompanying text (emphasizing the harsh 
conditions endured by black victims of coercive labor practices during the old 
peonage).  
 343. See supra notes 167–189 and accompanying text (explaining the never-
ending cycle of criminal-justice debt).  
 344. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996 (PRWORA), Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (requiring public 
assistance recipients to begin working within two years of receiving benefits) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607). 
 345. See Sharon Dietrich, et al., Work Reform: The Other Side of Welfare 
Reform, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 54 (1998) (explaining how criminal records, 
among other factors, can prevent a person from receiving welfare benefits); Joel 
F. Handler, Welfare-to-Work: Reform or Rhetoric?, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 635, 647–
51 (1998) (explaining how technical mistakes and criminal records prevent a 
number of people from receiving welfare benefits); see also Peter Edelman & 
Barbara Ehrenreich, Opinion, Why Welfare Reform has Failed, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 6, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/ 
12/04/AR2009120402604.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (arguing that welfare 
reform was “based on reckless assumptions about the economy, as well as a 
callous disregard for the realities of sustaining a family”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 346. See DAVID GREENBERG ET AL., WELFARE-TO-WORK BENEFITS AND COSTS: 
A SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH 5-6 (2009) (detailing that welfare-to-work programs 
reduced government expenditure on welfare programs); Handler, supra note 
345, at 637–41 (explaining the various ways that the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 allows states to spend 
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and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996,347 under the new peonage, those with 
criminal justice debt are mandated to pay their LFOs, and if they 
fall behind, they, too, are removed from public benefits rolls.348 It 
is not unusual for debtors like David Ramirez349 to “sacrifice food, 
clothing, utilities, sanitary home repairs, and other basic 
necessities of life in order to scrape together money” to pay off 
their LFOs in order to avoid imprisonment.350 And similar to the 
old peonage, the monies collected from LFOs go toward programs 
unrelated to the judicial system, including the state’s general 
revenue funds.351 
Under both the old and the new forms of peonage, the 
criminal justice system itself is complicit in their continued 
operation. Under the old, court personnel inconsistently 
maintained dockets and trial records, and sentences were handed 
down by “provincial judges, local mayors, and justices of the 
peace—often men in the employ of the white business owners 
who relied on the forced labor produced by the judgments.”352 
This enabled the coercive labor system to thrive despite anti-
peonage legislation and court decisions.353 Under the new form, 
court fees and fines are often assessed without consideration of 
the individual’s ability to pay, even in violation of state laws and 
court decisions.354 Meanwhile, state employees, operating under 
little or no supervision, hand down sentences with no incentive to 
                                                                                                     
significantly less money on welfare). 
 347. See Handler, supra note 345, at 637–47 (describing the effects of 
PRWORA’s implementation). 
 348. See ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 38, at 67–68 (explaining how 
LFOs can result in difficulties re-entering society as a result of reduced income, 
worsened credit, difficulty finding work and housing, and potential re-
incarceration). 
 349. See supra notes 20–27 and accompanying text (discussing Ramirez). 
 350. Class Action Complaint at 36, Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-
00253, 2015 WL 3417420 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015). 
 351. See supra notes 30–37 and accompanying text (discussing how these 
funds are collected and used). 
 352. BLACKMON, supra note 73, at 7; see also supra Part II.C (discussing the 
role of the judicial system in the corrupted system of criminal-justice debt). 
 353. See supra notes 94–98 (discussing the mechanisms of coercive labor 
that allowed for financial benefit).  
 354. See supra notes 253–290 and accompanying text (discussing the 
methods by which courts impose crippling fines). 
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maintain careful data or to engage in impact analysis of fees or 
costs.355 
Both the old and the new forms of peonage perpetuate the 
essence of involuntary servitude. Under the old, the state 
conspired with planters and merchants to use convict leasing and 
sharecropping to entrap former slaves in a cycle of coerced 
labor.356 Again, their apparent motivation was to support the 
struggling agrarian economy and to maintain the racial caste 
system.357 Under the new peonage, the punishment and 
incarceration of nonviolent offenders for criminal-justice debt, 
including at the pretrial stage when they are unable to post bail, 
has contributed to and sustained the prison industrial complex.358 
With millions of low-level offenders filling U.S. jails and prisons 
due (both directly and indirectly) to unpaid LFOs, private 
probation companies and the state and federal corrections 
agencies to which they supply goods and services have all thrived 
while the inmate population has expanded.359 Likewise, private 
corporations such as Honda, Microsoft, Starbucks, and Target 
have increasingly relied on prison labor, as it is cheap and 
virtually liability-free for the employer.360 Even the privatization 
                                                                                                     
 355. See supra Part II.C and accompanying text (explaining how the courts 
allowed and even encouraged allaying court fines in a racially motivated 
manner). 
 356. See supra notes 13–19 and accompanying text (providing an example of 
the coercive techniques used to keep former slaves in a never-ending cycle of 
debt).  
 357. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text (discussing the financial 
incentives for the entrapment of former slaves by debt).  
 358. See Michael Brickner & Shakyra Diaz, Prisons for Profits: Incarceration 
for Sale, 38 HUM. RTS. 13, 13–14 (2011) (discussing the power of the private 
prison lobby and arguing that the increase in incarceration rates may be 
attributed to private prisons); Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 
2015, at MM38 (reporting that hundreds of thousands of people are in pretrial 
detention in the United States, many for non-violent misdemeanor cases, 
because they cannot pay the bail that has been set). 
 359. See Brickner & Diaz, supra note 358 (discussing the status the modern 
private prison industry); see also Complaint at 2, Reynolds v. Judicial Corr. 
Servs. Inc., No. 2:15-cv-161-MHT-CSC (M.D. Ala. Mar. 12, 2015) (alleging that, 
working together, the City of Clanton, the Clanton Municipal Court, and a 
probation services company operate a racketeering enterprise that extorts court 
fines, costs, and fees from impoverished individuals under threat of jail, in 
violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and 
other laws).  
 360. Heather Ann Thompson, Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking 
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of youth confinement facilities is now widespread in the United 
States, with almost half of them privately operated, creating a 
built-in incentive for companies to increase the number of youth 
confined and lengthen the terms of their incarceration.361 In 
short, everyone wins—except the impoverished person unable to 
pay off her criminal justice debt.  
In these ways, an economic caste system is sustained under 
both the old and the new forms of peonage. Under the old system, 
state and county governments, large corporations, entrepreneurs, 
and provincial farmers ran forced labor camps that defeated 
meaningful freedom.362 Under the new peonage, the cycle of 
criminal-justice debt consistently suppresses the aspirations of 
those among the poor who fall into its remorseless system of fines 
and penalties.363 Disenfranchisement laws, both then and now, 
remove felons from the voting rolls, creating “a caste-like system 
aimed at keeping blacks out of office and away from the ballot 
box.”364 
Finally, and perhaps most poignantly, the roles of race and 
socioeconomic status must be examined. The historical record 
confirms that peonage and the laws of the 1870s and 1880s were 
“systematic efforts to reestablish white control over blacks on 
every front.”365 Although there was also a class struggle in the 
South during this period, it was conducted separately by whites 
and blacks, for “[o]n the matter of racial equality, whites, rich 
                                                                                                     
Crisis, Decline, and Transformation in Postwar American History, 97 J. AM. 
HIST. 703, 717, 722, 729 n.39 (2010) (“Prison labor was attractive to American 
employers for more reasons than lower wages; they also did not have to deal 
with sick days, unemployment insurance, or workman’s compensation claims, 
and they had few liability worries when it came to toxins or accidents in prison 
workplaces.”). 
 361. See NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE NETWORK, POLICY PLATFORM: 
CONFINING YOUTH FOR PROFIT 2–3 (July 2015), http://www.njjn.org/uploads/ 
digital-library/Confining-Youth-for-Profit_Sept2015FIN.pdf (detailing the moral 
and fiscal problems of imprisoning youth for profit).  
 362. See supra notes 97–100 (explaining both how the former slaves were 
forced into labor via debt, and the financial benefits of the plantation owners 
and farmers as a result). 
 363. See supra notes 261–290 (giving an example of how modern 
incarceration leads to an impossible-to-escape accumulation of debt). 
 364. COHEN, supra note 92, at XV. 
 365. Id. 
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and poor, usually possessed a common cultural outlook.”366 It can 
be argued that this dynamic contrasts with the new peonage, in 
which court fees and fines serve to oppress low-income 
individuals of all races and ethnicities. Yet, there is disturbing 
evidence that implicit racial bias guides the imposition of fees by 
judges and court administrators. Research confirms, for example, 
that courts impose a disproportionate burden of LFOs on low-
income people of color.367 For instance, a 2014 study of municipal 
courts in St. Louis, Missouri, found that a disproportionate 
percentage of those who are criminally prosecuted and assessed 
court costs and user fees are African Americans living below the 
poverty line.368 The report concluded that “it becomes all too 
clear that fines and fees are paid disproportionately by the 
African-American community. In other words, these 
municipalities’ method of financial survival—bringing in revenue 
via fines and fees—comes primarily at the expense of black 
citizens.”369  
In general, however, the suggestion that the impact of the 
new peonage is as much class-based as it is race-based finds 
support in the fact that disproportionately high percentages of 
African Americans are serving terms of incarceration that are not 
necessarily the direct result of an inability to pay court fees.370 In 
                                                                                                     
 366. Id. at XIV. 
 367. See, e.g., BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 4, 7–10 (analyzing statistics 
that show a correlation between race and fees imposed by the courts); JESSICA 
EAGLIN & DANYELLE SOLOMON, REDUCING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN 
JAILS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LOCAL PRACTICE 8 (2015) (“The collection of court 
costs and other financial obligations from defendants disproportionately 
burdens African Americans and Hispanics who cannot pay. Aggressive collection 
practices result in onerous and compounding debt, and even jail stays, for many 
defendants.”); BETTER TOGETHER, PUBLIC SAFETY–MUNICIPAL COURTS 2, 8 (Oct. 
2014) (analyzing the data indicating that the St. Louis County, Missouri courts 
operate as punitive revenue centers); see also ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 
38, at 10 (explaining that racial disparity exists at all levels of the criminal 
justice system).  
 368. See BETTER TOGETHER, supra note 367, at 8 (examining the collection 
and spending of court cost fees in St. Louis, Missouri, and finding that although 
the population of the county as a whole is 24% black with eleven percent living 
below the poverty line, the population of the municipalities that generate one 
third of the county’s general operating revenue is 62% black, with 22% living 
below the poverty line).  
 369. Id. at 3. 
 370. See Fredrick C. Harris & Robert C. Lieberman, Racial Inequality After 
THE NEW PEONAGE 1661 
other words, the population impacted by the new peonage may 
not be disproportionately composed of people of color, because 
both adults and youths of color have already been 
disproportionately stopped by police, arrested, charged, and 
convicted of criminal offenses—both serious and low-level—which 
have resulted in incarceration.371 Yet, this same reasoning 
suggests the inverse in regard to juvenile delinquency court, and 
it helps explain why large percentages of low-income juveniles of 
color are particularly vulnerable to criminal-justice debt: they are 
more likely than white youth to be charged with minor offenses 
that are merely the function of adolescence, rather than 
signifying criminality.372 In an era in which juvenile dispositions 
have become occasions for imposing court fees, fines, and 
restitution costs, rather than incarceration,373 young people of 
color bear the brunt of this burden.374 More research is clearly 
needed, however, as much of the data related to race, 
socioeconomic status, and criminal justice debt is anecdotal or 
produces results that are specific to the population studied and 
are not generalizable.375  
                                                                                                     
Racism: How Institutions Hold Back African Americans, 94 FOREIGN AFF. 9, 11–
18 (2015) (explaining how implicit structural racism and biases lead to 
disproportionately high arrest rates for African-Americans). 
 371. See EAGLIN & SOLOMON, supra note 367, at 8 (detailing racial 
disparities in the criminal justice system). 
 372. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 53, 71 (2012) (discussing the role of race-based criminalization in 
indebtedness); see also U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., SUMMARY OF 
FINDINGS: ST. LOUIS COUNTY FAMILY COURT 1–2 (July 31, 2015) (finding that the 
St. Louis Family Court “administration of juvenile justice discriminates against 
black children” in the areas of intake, pretrial detention, probation violations, 
and custody after adjudication). 
 373. See CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, ET AL., JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 2011, 52 
(July 2014) (explaining that in 2011 67% of juveniles age fifteen or younger who 
were adjudicated delinquent were put on probation, as compared to 61% of 
juveniles age sixteen or over). 
 374. See, e.g., Editorial, Children Caught in a Racist System, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 7, 2015, at A18 (“In St. Louis County, officials examined 33,000 juvenile 
court cases over a three-year period and found that the system regularly treats 
black children more harshly than white children and routinely denies indigent 
children—no matter their race—basic constitutional rights.”). 
 375. See, e.g., Ed Munoz & Stephen Sapp, Racial/Ethnic Misdemeanor 
Sentencing Disparities: Additional Evidence for Contextual Discrimination, 1 J. 
ETHNICITY IN CRIM. JUST. 27, 28 (2003) (finding, in a narrow study of 
misdemeanor sentences in five Nebraska counties, that non-white defendants 
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While not an exhaustive analysis, the foregoing discussion 
sets the stage for advancing several proposals for reform of the 
new peonage. 
IV. Proposals for Reform 
The proliferation of court fees, and the costs incurred by the 
state to collect them, has prompted some judges, politicians, and 
lawmakers to question whether the practice has gone too far.376 
With the increased attention of public policy advocates and think 
tanks,377 as well as the recent focus of the media,378 proposals for 
reform have been generated, and some states appear to have the 
will to take action. For instance, New Jersey initiated an amnesty 
program to encourage thousands of people who owe fines to 
appear at court sessions of the Fugitive Safe Surrender Program 
where judges reviewed files and ordered fee reductions.379 
Conducted during four days in November 2013, more than 4,500 
people turned themselves in, and hundreds with unpaid court 
fees and fines were able to gain significant reductions.380 Safe 
                                                                                                     
were sentenced to fines more than forty percent higher than those imposed on 
white defendants for similar offenses). 
 376. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 97–102 (2015) (calling for, among other things, reform to the way 
municipal courts charge and collect fees); LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 
OF THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA, NOT JUST A FERGUSON PROBLEM: HOW TRAFFIC 
COURTS DRIVE INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA (2015) (identifying the damage that 
municipal court practices in San Francisco can do to the impoverished and 
calling for change); Maura Dolan & Lee Romney, State Chief Justice Says 
Unpaid Traffic Fines Should Get a Day in Court, L.A. TIMES (May 21, 2015, 7:45 
AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-ca-chief-justice-unpaid-traffic-
fines-20150520-story.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (discussing how California 
Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye is calling for change to the way that traffic 
violation fines are handled) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 377. See generally BANNON ET AL., supra note 37; ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, 
supra note 38. 
 378. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, On Probation, Lives Can Run Far Off Track, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2015, at A1 (reporting on a woman living in Baltimore and 
struggling with the impact of criminal-justice debt, which led to job loss and 
more than a month in jail because she fell behind in her payments and could not 
afford to bail herself out). 
 379. See Shapiro, supra note 175 (describing the negative consequences of 
monetary fees imposed on indigent criminal defendants in multiple states).  
 380. Id. 
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Surrender programs for people who owe fines and fees are being 
developed in other parts of the United States, including 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin.381 In Colorado, after Denver County Court 
judges voted to stop issuing arrest warrants for failure to pay 
fines because of the expenses of tracking debtors down, court 
time, and imprisonment, Governor John Hickenlooper signed a 
law that prohibits judges from incarcerating people who cannot 
afford to pay court costs.382 The 2014 bill, which adopts the 
Supreme Court holding in Bearden v. Georgia,383 requires courts 
to examine a person’s ability to pay and to recommend a solution 
such as community service or a payment plan if the person 
cannot pay; only if the individual willfully chooses not to pay will 
she be held in contempt of court.384 Colorado Republicans and 
Democrats voted nearly unanimously for the bill,385 and a similar 
bill has been signed by the Governor of Illinois.386 In 2015, the 
                                                                                                     
 381. See Marge Pitrof, Plans in Motion for Fugitive Safe Surrender Program 
in Milwaukee, WUMR (July 15, 2015), http://wuwm.com/post/plans-motion-
fugitive-safe-surrender-program-milwaukee (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (quoting 
an organizer of the event as saying, “There are people who have fines and 
warrants that they think they will never be able to get out from under, so they 
refuse to try to go get jobs”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 382. See Recent Legislation, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1312, 1313–15 (2015) 
(describing the nature and impact of the new Colorado law); see also Leslie 
Jorgensen, Legislature Revokes “Debtors’ Prison,” COLO. OBSERVER (Apr. 24, 
2014), http://thecoloradoobserver.com/2014/04/legislature-revokes-go-to-jail-card-
for-people-too-poor-to-pay-fines/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (reporting on the 
passage of the “Debtors’ Prison Bill,” which received unanimous, bipartisan 
support in the Colorado House and Senate) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 383. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668–69 (1983) (prohibiting a 
sentencing court from revoking a defendant’s probation for the failure to make 
restitution, absent evidence and findings that he was responsible for the failure 
or that alternative forms of punishment were inadequate to meet the State’s 
interest in punishment and deterrence). 
 384. Recent Legislation, supra note 382, at 1315–16 (describing Colorado’s 
“Debtors’ Prison Bill,” which mandates on-the-record hearings before a court 
may revoke a defendant’s probation for the failure to pay criminal debts); 
Jorgensen, supra note 382 (noting that Colorado’s “Debtors’ Prison Bill” does not 
relieve solvent defendants from paying criminal debts). 
 385. Jorgensen, supra note 382. 
 386. See Bill Status of HB5434, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY (July 2012), 
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=5434&GAID=11&DocTy
peID=HB&LegId=65695&SessionID=84&GA=97 (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) 
(explaining the effect of the bill and its legislative history) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Georgia legislature passed a bill that allows courts to “waive, 
modify, or convert” LFOs upon evidence of significant financial 
hardship, inability to pay, or “any other extenuating factors 
which prohibit payment or collection.”387 
This Part advances several legislative and public policy 
reforms that are designed to end the phenomenon of the new 
peonage. 
A. Impact Analysis of Fees 
In order to accurately determine whether the imposition of 
fees increases revenue or lowers recidivism, states are 
increasingly relying upon evidence-based approaches.388 Advocacy 
organizations have conducted their own studies,389 and state 
legislatures have formed committees390 to study the fiscal and 
social costs of imposing fees and fines. Such an approach 
objectively demonstrates “whether a policy is fiscally sound, or 
merely a hypothetical revenue source that will actually cost more 
to implement than it generates in revenue.”391  
A data-driven approach is also more likely to receive 
bipartisan support. For instance, in 2011, Governor Steve 
Beshear of Kentucky signed a bipartisan bill into law, the Public 
Safety and Offender Accountability Act, which relied upon 
research-based strategies to “reduce recidivism, hold offenders 
accountable and maximize the state’s limited financial 
resources.”392 The reforms included strengthening parole and 
                                                                                                     
 387. H.B. 310, 42-8-102(e)(2), 2015–16 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015), available at 
http://www. legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20152016/153410.pdf. 
 388. See PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 47, at 11 (“Evidence-based practices 
significantly lower the costs borne by the state, and benefit the people involved 
in the system, making those practices a popular, bipartisan approach for 
criminal justice reform.”). 
 389. See id. (providing a study that examines the impact of fees and fines). 
 390. See id. (providing examples of committees that examine fees and fines). 
 391. Id. 
 392. Pew Applauds Kentucky Leaders for Comprehensive Public Safety 
Reforms, PEW CTR. ON THE STATES (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.prnewswire. 
com/news-releases/pew-applauds-kentucky-leaders-for-comprehensive-public-
safety-reforms-117341178.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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probation programs to reduce recidivism and to control costs.393 
Although it was not focused on court fees, the task force 
assembled to examine the data and develop a reform package 
included judges, a former prosecutor, and a former public 
defender, the composition of which can serve as a model for other 
legislative efforts.394 
An example of impact analysis in the context of LFOs may be 
found in the South Carolina Omnibus Crime Reduction and 
Sentencing Reform Act, passed with bipartisan support in 2010 
and drafted by a “multiple stakeholder group” that included 
community organizations, law enforcement, and practitioners.395 
The Act requires ongoing oversight in the form of annual 
reporting of all criminal-justice related expenditures, and it 
established the Sentencing Reform Oversight Committee to 
handle this reporting as well as the policy adjustments that 
might follow.396 In addition, the bill requires that fiscal impact 
statements accompany any proposed changes to sentencing 
provisions of criminal offenses.397 It specifies that the legislative 
committee examining the proposed legislation “shall not take 
action . . . until [it] has received the fiscal impact statement.”398 It 
mandates that state agencies and political subdivisions cooperate 
with the Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Office (RFAO) in preparing 
these statements, and that the RFAO request information from 
nongovernmental agencies and organizations to assist in 
                                                                                                     
 393. See id. (reporting that the reforms could result in gross savings of $422 
million over ten years). 
 394. See id. (alluding to the benefits of consulting numerous stakeholders in 
the Kentucky criminal justice system to forge a consensus on a series of 
comprehensive public safety reforms). 
 395. See South Carolina Governor Reduces Disparity Between Crack, Powder 
Cocaine, and Reforms Other Sentencing Policies, ASSOC. PRESS (June 3, 2010),  
http://www.sentencingproject.org/detail/news.cfm?news_id=928 (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2015) (reporting that the new law encompasses a package of criminal 
justice reforms) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 396. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., DUE SOUTH: SOUTH CAROLINA: JUSTICE SYSTEM 
OVERHAUL 1–2 (May 2011), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/ 
documents/due_south_-_south_carolina.pdf (describing that the Act “should 
result in fewer individuals returning to prison and more people having 
successful lives”). 
 397. See S.C. CODE § 2-7-74 (outlining the necessary components of fiscal 
impact statements following criminal offense changes). 
 398. Id. § 2-7-74(D). 
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preparing the fiscal impact statement.399 A section of the Act 
requires people convicted of drug law violations to pay a 
“controlled substance offense assessment” that would be directed 
to drug treatment courts and exempts those who are deemed to 
be indigent.400 Advocates, however, have noted that such fees are 
“still a burden to people who are convicted of drug offenses who 
are already facing challenges with being involved in the justice 
system.”401  
In short, evidence-based data analysis is a cost-effective and 
politically feasible method of revealing the negative fiscal impact 
that most criminal justice fees have on states, as well as their 
“anti-rehabilitative impact” on people.402 
B. Legislative Initiatives 
There are a number of legislative proposals that have been 
advanced by advocates and lawmakers to end the phenomenon of 
the new peonage.403 These include requirements that the court 
create and enforce fee exemptions and petitions for waivers for 
indigence; that court personnel clearly inform people of the 
possibility of exemptions; and that the procedure for obtaining 
them be well-defined and not overly-complex.404 A comprehensive 
exemption system includes an evaluation at the time of the 
criminal complaint or indictment of the individual’s ability to pay, 
before the court imposes any fees or fines. Likewise, there should 
be statutory protections for those who may initially have had an 
ability to pay but whose financial circumstances have changed. 
                                                                                                     
 399. Id. § 2-7-74(F), (H). 
 400. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 396, at 2 (noting that the 
reallocation of funds from criminal debt obligations to community-based 
treatment options that help people before they become involved in the criminal 
justice system may bring about more positive changes). 
 401. Id. 
 402. See PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 47, at 11 (demonstrating that numerous 
states are turning to evidence-based data analysis to determine the effects of 
imposing fees in the criminal justice system). 
 403. See id. at 11–18 (describing the success of legislation introduced by 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Maryland, and Washington that is aimed at 
reducing criminal justice debt). 
 404. See, e.g., id. at 14 (describing legislative proposals).  
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For people who do not initially qualify for waivers or exemptions, 
the court should develop personalized payment plans that allow 
for weekly or monthly payments for those who cannot afford to 
pay a lump-sum balance. Hawaii, Kansas, Connecticut, and Ohio 
are among the states that instruct courts to grant full or partial 
waivers for people who are unable to pay fees or fines.405 For 
instance, the Hawaii statute explicitly states in regard to 
“compensation fees” assessed upon conviction and probation fees 
assessed upon sentencing that “no fee shall be ordered when the 
court determines that the defendant is unable to pay the fee.”406 
There also are legislative proposals to eliminate unnecessary 
interest, late fees, and collateral consequences for defendants.407 
Such protections are necessary, as a number of states charge 
interest or late fees for late or missing payments even if the 
reasons for nonpayment are compelling, such as child support 
obligations.408 The amount charged for late fees can be 
exorbitant, such as California’s $300 late fee.409 Proposed 
                                                                                                     
 405. See H.R. 2668, 2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2010) (concerning 
crimes, punishment and criminal procedure); 2010 Kan. Sess. Laws Ch. 136 
(same); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-30(e) (2012) (requiring courts to waive the costs 
of electronic monitoring if the court finds that the person subject to electronic 
monitoring on probation is indigent and unable to pay); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 
5120:1-1-02 (2015) (prohibiting the division of parole and community services 
from imposing a supervision fee if the offender demonstrates that he or she is 
indigent and unable to procure the fee); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-605 (2015) 
(requiring that courts waive the imposition of a compensation fee upon 
conviction if a defendant is unable to pay); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-641 (2015) 
(prohibiting courts from imposing a fee on a criminal defendant during 
sentencing unless the defendant is or will be able to pay the fine); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 706-648 (2015) (prohibiting courts from imposing a probation services fee 
on a criminal defendant unless the defendant is or will be able to pay the fine). 
 406. HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-648(1)(b) (2012); § 706-605(6); cf. Melissa B. 
Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An Alternative 
Account of Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 539–42 
(2006) (discussing the enactment of new laws to protect uninsured patients from 
hospital overcharging and aggressive collection practices that lead to the 
garnishment of wages, imposition of liens on homes, and freezing of bank 
accounts). 
 407. See PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 47, at 17 (noting features of legislative 
proposals). 
 408. See id. (describing conflicting obligations that may subject those with 
outstanding criminal debts to additional fees).  
 409. See id. (criticizing California’s one-time late fee as well as policies 
enforced by some Florida counties, which impose an additional ten to twenty 
dollar fee every time a defendant makes a late payment). 
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legislation would prohibit the assessment of such charges unless 
the court first conducts an on-the-record inquiry to determine the 
ability to pay.410 Similarly, if the failure to pay is not willful, the 
court would waive any accrued interest, surcharges, or related 
criminal-justice debt, and suspend all required payments and 
interest accrued between the filing of the petition for a hearing 
and the court hearing on the petition.411 The State of Washington, 
for instance, has introduced legislation that waives LFO interest 
accrual when people are incarcerated.412 One related proposal is 
to prohibit the suspension of driver’s licenses for failure to pay, as 
this policy can lead to a lack of transportation and loss of 
employment, which are particularly pernicious collateral 
consequences of debt.413  
Proposals have also been put forward to end the practice of 
extended probationary supervision for non-willful failure to 
pay.414 At least thirteen states have statutes that allow for this 
counterproductive practice, creating a system in which people 
who have satisfied all the other conditions of probation are forced 
to remain on supervision merely as a consequence of debt.415 
Likewise, some states have prohibited the practice of 
incarcerating people who have committed non-violent technical 
violations of probation, such as failure to pay fees, fines, or 
                                                                                                     
 410. See id. (outlining the procedures necessary to determine an individual’s 
ability to pay).  
 411. See id. at n.80 (noting that although proposed legislation in some states 
could result in the waiver or abatement of criminal debt obligations, this may 
not be an option in all jurisdictions). 
 412. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.090(2) (2015) (permitting the courts to 
reduce or waive the interest on legal financial obligations levied as a result of a 
criminal conviction); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.110(4) (2010) (describing the 
process by which interest on judgments shall be calculated); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 19.52.020 (1989) (describing the process by which the maximum possible 
interest rates for interest on judgments are set). 
 413. See PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 47, at 18 (arguing that employment is a 
major part of the rehabilitative and reentry process, which is jeopardized when 
and individual loses their ability to legally drive). 
 414. See id. at 20 (describing statutes, regulations, and policies in Ohio and 
Virginia that prohibit the extension of probation or parole due to failure to pay 
criminal justice debt). 
 415. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 25 (revealing that Alabama, 
Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia all continue the practice of 
extending a defendant’s probation for non-willful failure to pay). 
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costs.416 The report of a panel in Virginia that recommended such 
a law stated that if those who owed fees and fines were freed from 
probation, 
[T]hen probation and parole officers would have more time and 
resources to supervise more serious and higher-risk offenders. 
In addition it would reduce the number of technical violators 
brought back to court and returned to prison.417 
The argument that onerous debt collection policies and practices 
place an avoidable resource strain on states and municipalities 
may be one of the most politically persuasive to lawmakers 
considering these proposals.418  
It is critical to keep in mind, however, that although 
legislative responses to the new peonage are a promising 
strategy, they raise unanswered questions. For instance, 
language supplied by statute or developed through appellate 
review must provide more precise definitions of terms such as 
“indigence,” “undue hardship,” “a finding of financial ability to 
pay,” and “sufficient bona fide efforts to pay” if these protections 
are to be effective in dismantling the modern debtors’ prison.419 
Otherwise, courts and individual judges will continue to have 
unfettered discretion to determine which defendants qualify for 
relief and which do not.420 Of course bills such as those developed 
in Colorado are an improvement on the status quo, as they 
require courts to make specific determinations related to 
indigence on the record,421 but such laws must be carefully 
                                                                                                     
 416. See, e.g., H.R. 2309, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2009); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 19.2-305 (West 2012) (requiring fines, costs, restitution for damages, 
support or community services from probationer). 
 417. ALTERNATIVES FOR NON-VIOLENT OFFENDERS TASK FORCE, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2009), http://leg2.state.va.us/dls/h&sdocs.nsf/By+Year/RD 
4302009/$file/RD430.pdf. 
 418. See PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 47, at 5–6 (arguing that debt collection 
policies place significant fiscal costs and burdens on states). 
 419. See Recent Legislation, supra note 382 at 1316–19 (elaborating on the 
importance of providing precise definitions and adequate guidance for courts 
who are tasked with upholding legislative responses to debtors’ prisons). 
 420. See id. (noting that while Colorado requires on-the-record indigency 
hearings before incarcerating debtors for failing to pay debts owed to the state, 
the legislature’s failure to provide substantive guidance may prove problematic). 
 421. See supra notes 402–407 and accompanying text (describing aspects of 
bills that are designed to combat the problems associated with criminal-justice 
debt). 
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drafted and monitored to ensure accountability and effective 
enforcement. 
C. Right to Counsel in Non-Payment Hearings 
It is long-settled law that the Sixth Amendment requires 
that counsel be appointed to indigent criminal defendants who 
face the risk of the loss of liberty.422 Most states hold that this 
right, which derives from the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, also applies to civil proceedings.423 Most 
                                                                                                     
 422. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (holding that the state 
was not obligated to provide counsel when the conviction did not result in actual 
imprisonment, despite the fact that imprisonment was a potential penalty); 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (finding that courts must 
determine whether appointment of counsel is necessary at probation and parole 
revocation hearings); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding 
that a defendant may not be subject to imprisonment without the aid of counsel, 
regardless of whether the offense was a misdemeanor or felony, and regardless 
of whether the offense qualified for a jury trial); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36–37 
(1967) (holding that juveniles have the right to counsel in delinquency 
proceedings); Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964) (concluding that the 
right to counsel attaches when a suspect is indicted); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335, 342–45 (1963) (establishing that an indigent defendant in a criminal 
trial has a right to the assistance of counsel, and that it is a fundamental right 
essential to a fair trial).  
 423. See Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statutes Providing for a Right to 
Counsel in Civil Cases, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POV. L. & POL’Y 245, 252–70 
(2006) (showing that most states appoint counsel for civil litigants in certain 
circumstances); William L. Dick, The Right to Appointed Counsel for Indigent 
Civil Litigants: The Demands of Due Process, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627, 627–
32 (1989) (applying the Fourteenth Amendment to the right to counsel in civil 
proceedings); see also Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) 
(establishing that the Due Process Clause does not automatically require the 
state to provide counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent 
noncustodial parent who is subject to a child support order, even if that 
individual faces incarceration); Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 
26–27 (1981) (finding that there is a due process right to appointed counsel 
when a litigant may lose his physical liberty if he does not prevail in the 
litigation, and that a balancing test should be used to make this determination, 
considering the private interests at stake, the risk that the procedures used will 
lead to erroneous decisions, and the government’s interest); Matthews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339–41 (1976) (concluding that the Due Process Clause 
does not require a hearing prior to the termination of social security disability 
benefits, based on the balancing private interests and the government’s 
interest); see also Kathryn A. Sabbeth, The Prioritization of Criminal over Civil 
Counsel and the Discounted Danger of Private Power, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 889, 
906–16 (2015) (examining the relative importance assigned to civil and criminal 
THE NEW PEONAGE 1671 
states also agree with Supreme Court dicta in Lassiter v. 
Department of Social Services that relying on the “civil” or 
“criminal” label placed on a proceeding when determining 
whether there is a right to counsel is not particularly helpful in 
this subset of cases, as the possibility of incarceration is an 
equally serious restraint on one’s liberty interests whether it 
results from a civil or criminal matter.424 State courts are split, 
however, on how best to determine whether the right exists when 
applied to a given set of facts, with some courts holding that a 
balancing test should be used on a case-by-case basis,425 and 
others holding that the right to counsel should be presumptively 
guaranteed in all matters that could potentially result in 
incarceration.426 Several states have even held that there is no 
right to counsel in civil fee collection proceedings regardless of 
whether the defendant could be incarcerated, invoking the 
civil/criminal distinction to support their holdings, thereby 
rejecting Lassiter.427 
                                                                                                     
counsel, including the fact that civil judgments result in far-reaching collateral 
consequences, and arguing that the prioritization of criminal over civil counsel 
reflects a mistaken view of lawyers’ primary role as a shield against government 
power). 
 424. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24–25 (1981) 
(emphasizing that, in determining whether due process requires the 
appointment of counsel for an indigent litigant, a court must first focus on the 
potential curtailment of the indigent’s personal liberty rather than on the “civil” 
or “criminal” label placed on the proceeding); see also McBride v. McBride, 431 
S.E.2d 14, 16–17 (N.C. 1993) (citing Lassiter for the same proposition). 
 425. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dept. of Human Servs. v. Rael, 642 P.2d 1099, 
1104 (N.M. 1982) (concluding that a balancing test should be used to determine 
whether an indigent parent should be appointed counsel in a child support 
case); Duval v. Duval, 322 A.2d 1, 3–4 (N.H. 1974) (holding that a trial court 
may, in its discretion, appoint counsel to assist an indigent defendant to present 
his case in a complicated nonsupport contempt hearing in which the defendant 
faces imprisonment).  
 426. See, e.g., State v. Stone, 268 P.3d 226, 235 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) 
(finding that whether a proceeding is civil or criminal, due process is implicated 
whenever incarceration is a possibility, and the defendant should be appointed 
counsel at public expense); McBride, 431 S.E.2d at 18 (concluding that due 
process requires a presumption in favor of an indigent defendant’s right to 
appointed counsel when a proceeding can result in incarceration). 
 427. See, e.g., Andrews v. Walton, 428 So. 2d 663, 666 (Fla. 1983) (finding 
that a defendant held in contempt for failure to pay child support and sentenced 
to thirty days in jail was not entitled to counsel because it is a civil contempt 
proceeding); Meyer v. Meyer, 414 A.2d 236, 239 (Maine 1980) (finding that a 
defendant in child support contempt case had no right to counsel because the 
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An argument that is gaining traction is that there should 
presumptively be a right to counsel for indigent litigants in 
nonpayment hearings whenever those hearings can result in 
incarceration or an extension of probation or parole.428 In the 
recent case of State v. Stone,429 James Stone pleaded guilty in 
2001 to unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine) and second degree theft, and the trial court 
sentenced him to 105 days in jail and twelve months of 
community custody with a fine of $2,860.430 Two years later his 
supervision was transferred from the Washington Department of 
Corrections to the superior court clerk’s office, as he now owed 
(adding the interest) $3,179.431 Two months later, without being 
told of the right to counsel, he signed an order agreeing to 
minimum monthly payments of twenty-five dollars, and agreeing 
that if he failed to pay, an arrest warrant would be issued.432 For 
the next twenty-nine months, Stone made the monthly payments, 
but when he missed a payment and a court appearance, an arrest 
warrant was issued, and he was sentenced to ten days in jail.433 
This was followed by a period when he once again made 
payments.434 This scenario continually repeated itself; yet for 
three years the court did not inquire as to whether Stone wished 
                                                                                                     
proceedings were civil and not criminal); Adkins v. Adkins, 248 S.E.2d 646, 646–
47 (Ga. 1978) (determining that appointed counsel is not required in a contempt 
hearing for failure to pay child support, even when the defendant was 
imprisoned, as it is a civil proceeding); In re Calhoun, 350 N.E.2d 665, 666–67 
(Ohio 1976) (determining that there is no right to counsel in civil proceedings 
that can result in incarceration). But see In re Miami County Grand Jury 
Directive to Creager, 82 Ohio App. 3d 269, 272 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (concluding 
that a balancing test should be used when determining whether there is a right 
to counsel in a civil contempt hearing). 
 428. See PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 47, at 22 (illustrating the importance of 
a defendant’s right to counsel at enforcement proceedings for payment 
obligations arising from his or her criminal sentences). 
 429. 268 P.3d 226, 227 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). 
 430. Id. at 228. 
 431. Id. 
 432. See id. (describing the fines and fees comprising Stone’s total criminal 
debt obligation).  
 433. See id. at 228–29 (emphasizing that when the trial court asked Stone if 
there was anything that he would like to say, Stone replied that “he had been 
evicted from his home . . . and that he didn’t just blatantly want to blow off the 
Court and not make his payments . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 434. Id. 
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to have counsel appointed.435 After the court finally inquired of 
him and counsel was appointed, a fact-finding hearing was held 
one week later, which the appellate court described as follows: 
Stone testified that he was homeless; that he was left handed 
and limited to twenty-five percent use of that hand; that the 
Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) paid his 
medical bills; that his only source of income was monthly net 
payments of $339 from a . . . program . . . due to [his] disability 
with [his] shoulder; and that he spent this money on shelter, 
cigarettes, and “a few other necessities” like food. He also 
testified that it cost him approximately $100 to travel to 
Jefferson County for court appearances.436  
At the hearing’s conclusion, the judge sentenced Stone to forty-five 
days in jail, with no inquiry as to his income or ability to pay, and 
without granting a deduction in his LFO debt for either of his two 
previous periods of incarceration.437 On review, the Court of 
Appeals of Washington held that a person has an absolute right 
to counsel at “ability-to-pay” hearings where incarceration may 
result, and that Stone’s due process rights were violated when he 
was incarcerated without findings regarding his ability to pay:438 
Stone’s lack of counsel during these proceedings created an 
‘asymmetry of representation’ because a prosecuting attorney 
represented the State in this adversarial proceeding. As the 
United States Supreme Court has observed, “The average 
defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect 
himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his 
life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by 
experienced and learned counsel.”439 
                                                                                                     
 435. See id. at 228–30 (noting that the record contained an acknowledgment 
of defendant’s rights signed by Stone, but that the trial court never orally 
advised Stone of a right to counsel and neglected to ask him whether he wished 
to have an attorney appointed). 
 436. Id. at 230. 
 437. See id. (referencing comments made by the trial judge who determined 
that Stone’s failure to contact the court, by phone or letter, amounted to a 
willful failure to pay and appear). 
 438. See id. at 233–36 (determining that the County’s “policy or placing 
convicted felons on a pay or appear calendar and requiring them to represent 
themselves violates fundamental due process rights”). 
 439. Id. at 235 (citations omitted). 
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The federal appellate court clearly recognized that if counsel 
had represented James Stone at the first enforcement proceeding, 
it would have made the difference between his maintaining and 
losing his liberty down the road. Counsel is needed to gather and 
present evidence regarding the defendant’s ability to pay, to 
assist her in navigating the often-complex procedures for 
requesting a reduction or waiver of fees, and to ensure that she 
understands the ramifications of payment orders or 
commitments.440 As discussed above, it is likely that early 
appointment of counsel will ultimately save the jurisdiction 
monies spent in repeated attempts at collection, issuing and 
serving arrest warrants, and the costs of incarceration.441 
Of course it is critical to keep in mind that when counsel is 
appointed, at least forty-three states and the District of Columbia 
can require defendants to contribute to its cost.442 This fee is 
often a significant component of the total debt burden imposed by 
LFOs, and given the disproportionate representation of low-
income defendants and civil litigants struggling under the new 
peonage, it rests squarely on the backs of those least able to 
afford it.443 In Florida and Ohio, individuals must pay defender 
fees even if they are acquitted or the charges are dismissed.444 In 
states that offer hardship waivers of these fees by statute, some 
fail to provide them in practice.445 Additionally, defender fees 
                                                                                                     
 440. See PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 47, at 22 (emphasizing the importance 
of counsel when courts assess fees or fines).  
 441. See supra Part III.D (explaining that the cost of collecting fines and fees 
and incarcerating those who cannot pay often exceeds the revenue generated by 
fines and fees). 
 442. See Shapiro, supra note 175 (citing a state-by-state survey conducted by 
NPR on the number of states in which defendants can be billed for a public 
defender). 
 443. See supra notes 322–326 and accompanying text (contending that 
criminal justice debt is a regressive tax). 
 444. See FLA. STAT. § 27.52(1)(b) (2012) (requiring that an applicant pay a 
fifty dollar application fee to the clerk for each application for court-appointed 
counsel filed); OHIO REV. CODE § 120.36(A)(1) (2006) (requiring that an applicant 
pay an “application fee to the clerk of court at the time the person files an 
affidavit of indigency or a financial disclosure form with the court, a state public 
defender . . . or any other counsel appointed by the court . . .”). 
 445. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 12 (finding that in Arizona, courts 
order defendants to pay public defense costs in the majority of cases, and that 
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often serve to discourage low-income people, including children in 
juvenile court, from exercising their constitutional right to 
counsel, resulting in systematic waivers of counsel.446 
Yet, if the right to counsel at nonpayment hearings is 
implemented in combination with the legislative proposals 
discussed above,447 such as the exemption of attorney fees for 
indigence, these costs should cease to be a significant hardship 
for low-income defendants.  
D. Increase Job Training and Placement 
One last proposal that will lessen the harmful impact of 
criminal-justice fees is to require that states focus on offender 
rehabilitation through rigorous job training, treatment, and 
placement programs, rather than by assessing fees or mandating 
community service hours that interfere with training and 
employment. Well-designed community service programs can, of 
course, help those with criminal convictions to develop job skills 
                                                                                                     
many courts utilize uniform fee structures that do not take into account the 
ability to pay). 
 446. See Juvenile Justice Guide Book for Legislators, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES 4 (2011), www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/jjguidebook-complete.pdf 
(finding that many states require administrative fees prior to submitting an 
application to apply for court-appointed counsel in juvenile court, and that 
“[s]ome consider these fees prohibitive to youths who have very little money”). 
Of course, even when counsel is appointed and the attorney fees are not overly 
burdensome, the quality of counsel can be substandard, particularly for 
juveniles. See Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 771, 791–800 (2010) (discussing the nature and pervasiveness of 
substandard legal representation in juvenile court, the negative effects of poor 
lawyering on youth, and the structural causes and resistance to the 
empowerment of youth); see also, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS 
DIVISION, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: ST. LOUIS COUNTY FAMILY COURT 1–2 (July 31, 
2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-releases-findings-constitu 
tional-violations-juvenile-delinquency-matters (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) 
(finding that the St. Louis Family Court “fails to provide adequate 
representation for children in delinquency proceedings, in violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 447. See supra Part IV.B (discussing legislative proposals that would 
mitigate criminal-justice debt). 
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and to gain the training necessary to avoid reoffending.448 For 
those with mental illness or developmental disability, however, 
their participation in such programs may not be possible. 
Likewise, many states offer only limited community service 
options in lieu of paying off debt.449 For instance, in Florida, very 
few judges agree to convert mandatory criminal debt imposed in 
felony cases to community service.450 In North Carolina, the law 
prohibits this practice altogether.451 
For those who are able to participate, when community 
service programs are well-structured and robust, the benefits can 
be long-lasting.452 One county in Pennsylvania offers work details 
in lieu of criminal-justice debt payments at preauthorized, well-
functioning sites, such as the Salvation Army or YMCA.453 It also 
provides a program for those incarcerated at the county prison to 
work on county property, such as the local courthouse.454 In this 
way, people gain job skills while avoiding debt. As one public 
defender reflected: 
[T]he work program offers the person a chance to prove to 
themselves, family and the court that they are serious about 
reintegrating themselves as a productive, responsible member 
of the community, building self-esteem and dignity along the 
way . . . and of course the ultimate goal, reducing 
recidivism.455 
                                                                                                     
 448. See PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 47, at 23 (noting that, in the 
alternative, “poor program design can stymie the potential rehabilitative 
benefits”). 
 449. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 15 (describing that even in states 
that offer community service options in lieu of criminal justice debt, practices 
vary significantly). 
 450. See, e.g., Diller supra note 322, at 23 (“In a report from court clerks, 
only [sixteen] of [sixty-seven] counties reported converting any mandatory LFOs 
imposed in felony cases to community service.”). 
 451. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 15 n.69 (noting that “research did 
not identify any statute authorizing a community service option in North 
Carolina, and interviewees indicated that no option is available in practice”). 
 452. See id. at 17 (describing that such programs allow participants to avoid 
financial hardships arising from criminal justice debt until they are released 
from prison or locate gainful employment).  
 453. See id. (reporting that the County also permits participants to seek 
approval from the work crew supervisor to volunteer at other locations). 
 454. Id. 
 455. Id.  
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In short, time-limited community service that is directly tied to 
job training and placement is a useful model for addressing 
criminal justice debt. 
V. Conclusion  
There are many parallels between the post-Civil War system 
of coerced labor for debt and the new form that has developed 
with the proliferation of economic sanctions in U.S. courts.456 The 
most obvious, perhaps, is legalized discrimination. Like peonage 
in the late nineteenth century, the new peonage marginalizes 
large segments of the community, segregates them physically in 
jails, prisons, and ghettos, and then authorizes discrimination 
against them in the judicial system, with collateral consequences 
in areas such as employment, voting, and public benefits.457 As a 
result, Marcus,458 a Georgia “peon” in the 1880s, and David 
Ramirez,459 living in the 2010s in Washington State, have more 
in common than their generational, ethnic, and cultural 
differences would suggest. 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court issued decisions in the 
1910s, and then again in the 1970s and 1980s, that invalidated 
laws that perpetuated both forms of peonage, the practice 
persists.460 Ironically, at least in the contemporary context, this 
hidden regressive tax frequently fails to generate state 
revenue.461 Instead, it burdens the court system and interferes 
with the proper administration of justice. It also contributes to 
extreme family hardship, which increases the risk of recidivism 
and the intergenerational transmission of poverty.462 
Proposals to end the phenomenon of the new peonage do 
exist, and their success has been demonstrated in a variety of 
                                                                                                     
 456. See supra Part III.E (comparing the old and new peonage). 
 457. See supra Part III.E (comparing the old and new peonage). 
 458. See supra notes 3–17 and accompanying text (explaining Marcus’s life 
story). 
 459. See supra notes 20–31 and accompanying text (describing David 
Ramirez’s crippling criminal-justice debt). 
 460. BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 19. 
 461. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the impact analysis of fees). 
 462. See supra Part III.C (discussing collateral consequences on the family). 
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laws and programs across the United States.463 The open 
question is whether our legislators and judges have the will to 
end this two-tiered system of justice. As the Court stated in 
Bearden v. Georgia: 
[T]he State argues that its interests in punishing the 
lawbreaker and deterring others from criminal behavior 
require it to revoke probation for failure to pay a fine or 
restitution. The State clearly has an interest in punishment 
and deterrence, but this interest can often be served fully by 
alternative means.464 
For criminal justice advocates, few issues are more pressing than 
working to ensure that America’s current economic caste system 
will be its last. 
                                                                                                     
 463. See PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 47, at 11–24 (describing criminal debt 
reform laws and programs in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Maryland, 
Washington, and Florida). 
 464. 461 U.S. 660, 671–72 (1983). 
